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The epistemologies of Michael Oakeshott and Michael Polanyi are significant to 
the study of politics in that they justify a revision of the underlying positivist assumptions 
of mainstream social science methodological approaches.  In this comparative analysis of 
these two philosophers’ work, the epistemological concepts of tacit knowledge and 
practical knowledge are examined in order to explain why it is that a fundamentally 
positivist understanding of knowledge is illusory.  This analysis points to a post-
modernist approach to social phenomena, with a more holistic understanding of such 
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The prevailing methodological approach to the study of politics in academia 
stems from the assumptions of logical positivism, which rest mainly on the principle of 
verificationism.  What this refers to is the notion that only tautologies and the 
propositions that are verifiable by concrete, observable data are scientifically meaningful.  
The positivists assumed that “the methods used in the mathematizing sciences of the 
external world were possessed of some inherent virtue and that all other sciences would 
achieve comparable success if they followed the example and accepted these methods as 
their model.”1  Secondly, they assumed that “the methods of the natural sciences were a 
criterion for theoretical relevance in general.”2  The emergence of this positivist approach 
preceded by several decades the behaviouralist revolution in the social sciences in the 
1950s, and stemmed from a concern amongst some scholars about a lack of legitimacy 
and neutrality in the study of politics.  It may also have alleviated the psychic anxiety 
engendered in the minds of those for whom metaphysical concepts were experientially 
not comprehensible.  The underlying philosophical assumptions of positivism, however, 
hark back to the thought of continental European philosophers of science such as 
Nicholas de Condorcet, Auguste Comte, and St. Simon in the 1820s approximately, and 
more recently to members of the Vienna Circle who gathered in the 1920s and 30s in 
order to elaborate the positivist program.3  Essentially, though, these assumptions were 
borne of the gnostic illusion that laws of human progress were as real and discernible as 
                                                
1     Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), 4. 
2     Ibid. 
3     See Friedrich von Hayek, “The Counter-Revolution of Science,” in Economica, New Series, Vol. 8, 




the laws governing natural phenomena and of the transference of the Christian spiritual 
trinity to human history and knowledge, which engendered the familiar three-stage 
modern conceptualization of time.4 
 
The study of politics in academia as we know it today in North America emerged 
from a historical and legal approach and eventually adopted its positivist cloak when 
concerns were expressed as to the lack of a more systematic approach that could generate 
more assurance in the predictive capacities of its results.  When European political 
scholars who were escaping the Second World War were granted refuge and professional 
positions in American universities, a reform occurred in the field.  These scholars brought 
with them a vision of social studies greatly influenced by continental proponents of a 
positivist approach to social questions, e.g. Condorcet and Saint Simon.  In their attempt 
to mold American political studies to their understanding of a proper, more scientific 
approach, they infused the original departments with logical positivism as the 
epistemological backbone of social sciences.  The 1950s are referred to as the 
behavioural revolution in these fields, the premise being the study of social conduct as 
governed by natural laws.  The term “behave” points to conduct that is predetermined by 
laws already existing, the quest for political science being to discover these laws that 
govern political behaviour.  At its core however, the positivist ideology was a reactionary 
negation of all things metaphysical.  In Rudolf Carnap's words, “Metaphysical statements 
are all those propositions which claim to represent knowledge about something which is 
over or beyond all experience, e.g., about the real essence of things in themselves, the 
                                                




Absolute, and such like.”5  For the positivist, experience is reduced to sense experience, 
and all metaphysically related concepts are but imaginary frivolities.  Consequently, any 
notion of ethics is reduced to the pain/pleasure dimension of feeling, and the episteme 
politike is lost. 
 
Eventually, the positivist influence gave way to criticism of its main tenets and it 
lost many adherents, but the positivist attitude still informs the current methodologies 
used in the field, and its assumptions are seldom addressed.  While the influence of 
logical positivism has waned in the field of the philosophy of science, its assumptions 
still guide the study of politics.  What is problematic yet understandable about this 
situation is that, once the student of politics or the political scientist has adopted a given 
methodology, its underlying assumptions are seldom questioned from an epistemological 
perspective.  This is understandable because questions of epistemology are not 
necessarily of interest to the political scientist.  What is problematic is that epistemology 
is fundamental to all cognitive endeavours.  Implied in the underlying philosophy of 
social science to which political scientists explicitly or implicitly adhere, are assumptions 
about the way in which cognition works and what constitutes knowledge.  If assumptions 
about the way in which we come to know something go unquestioned, methodological 
assumptions are left unchallenged. 
 
In light of this, a comparative study of Michael Oakeshott’s (1901-1990) and 
Michael Polanyi’s (1891-1976) respective epistemological perspectives may offer a 
                                                
5     Dante Germino quoting Rudolf Carnap, “The Revival of Political Theory”, in The Journal of Politics, 




richer conception of the study of politics.  They are comparable on the grounds that each 
offers a perspective that criticizes and rejects the positivist approach to the study of 
politics.  The research questions that guide this thesis are: a) what are Oakeshott’s and 
Polanyi’s respective philosophies of science and epistemological perspectives; b) what is 
the import of their philosophies for the study of politics; and c) whose perspective is 
more appropriate and/or significant for the study of politics?  Although their 
epistemologies stem from different philosophical schools, Polanyi being a realist, and 
Oakeshott an idealist, they both offer a similar critique of the current positivist approach 
to the study of politics.  Polanyi’s concept of personal knowledge and Oakeshott’s notion 
of ‘practical’ knowledge undermine the ideal of exact, neutral and value-free knowledge.  
Their epistemologies oppose the reductionist aspect of positivism that inherently neglects 
and shuns the personal and subsidiary dimensions of cognition.  It will be argued that: a) 
each of their concepts of practical and subsidiary knowledge achieve the necessary 
correction to our misconceived ideal of disincarnate and rationalist knowledge, even if, in 
my view, Polanyi's explanation of subsidiarity achieves this more successfully; b) while 
Polanyi's realism is a much needed correction to relativism, Oakeshott's idealism is more 
comprehensive; c) because Polanyi's fiduciary programme is untenable, Oakeshott's 
experiential framework, however omniscient it may seem to some, is more attuned to our 
present experience; and yet, d) Polanyi's elucidation of the cognitive powers of the mind 
brings us closer to a restorative endeavour in the science of politics. 
 
This comparative study is structured so as to offer a description of both 




comparatively in the third and final part.  Parts I and II begin with an explanation of the 
epistemological premise of each philosopher, followed by the key concepts permeating 
these philosophers' respective epistemology, and finally offer an explanation of the 
import of these philosophers' epistemology to the study of politics.  Accordingly, Part I, 
on Michael Oakeshott, consists of a preliminary description of idealism as the 
philosophical backdrop to Oakeshott's epistemology, then engages Oakeshott's concept of 
experience from which he derives his understanding of practical and technical 
knowledge, the explanation of which follows.  Finally, his understanding of what the 
study of politics should consist of is considered. 
 
In part II, Michael Polanyi's epistemological premise in realism is elaborated, 
followed by an explanation of his concept of personal knowledge from which he derives 
his notions of tacit and focal knowledge, and finally, what Polanyi's epistemology 
signifies for the study of politics is explained.  I then consider their epistemologies 
critically and comparatively in Part III, beginning with my argument as to why their 
respective notions of tacit and practical knowledge are equally significant to the study of 
politics.  Following this I compare and critique their respective philosophical traditions of 
idealism and realism, and then offer a comparative critique of the fiduciary element in 
Polanyi's thought and the experiential basis of Oakeshott's epistemology.  Finally, I 
explain why the transcendental element in Polanyi's epistemology achieves more in the 
endeavour to restore to the study of politics its episteme.  In conclusion, a consideration 
of what the study of politics might consist of, were the epistemologies of these two 




Part I: Michael Oakeshott’s Epistemology and its Import for the Study of Politics 
  
1- Michael Oakeshott’s Epistemological Premise6 
Michael Oakeshott derives his epistemological perspective from the philosophical 
tradition of idealism.  It posits a unified experiential ground of cognition in response to 
the limitations perceived in the opposing perspectives of transcendental realism and 
nominalism.  The realist strand emerged concretely in Plato’s conceptualization of 
knowing.  There is a world of hidden essence behind the illusory variety of particulars we 
see around us, and man is capable of making contact with and knowing this hidden world 
of pure Being by means of a theoretical disposition towards it.  This essential element, or 
idea, behind the form, is universal and timeless.  John is mortal and transitory, but the 
essence of Man, as idea or concept, is eternal.  To see is to make one’s way to the 
essential.  In Plato’s allegory of the cave, it is to discern the shadows on the walls and to 
make one’s way out towards the sun.  Philosophy is the endeavour to make contact with 
the essence of particulars.  The latter, being eternal and universal, exists regardless of 
one’s sensorial misconceptions.  Pure ‘Being’ simply is. 
 
The most common alternative to transcendental Realism is a view in which the 
names of things are not conceived as references to eternal and immutable essences.  
Instead, these supposedly essential concepts, e.g., trees, human beings, bears, relations, 
causes, effects, justice, are but names of things we perceive.  They are inventions of ours 
for the efficient, conceptual organization of the particulars.  They do not point to hidden 
                                                




essences, of which there are none.  There is merely a variety of things.  We categorize 
such things as plants, animals and humans, but these categories are merely heuristic.  
Nominalism, from nomina or names, involves the rejection of the conclusions of 
transcendental realism, instead insisting upon a refusal to lose oneself in theoretical 
dreamland, a loyalty to the empirical world we live in, and a reliance on the sensory 
organs that perceive this tangible world of ours. 
 
Both traditions can be equally convincing.  Could it be possible that they each 
carry truth?  The affirmative answer to this question is what idealism suggests.  Seeking 
to embrace the whole of experience, from both the seer’s and the empiricist’s 
perspectives, idealists try to offer an epistemological explanation that is true to the whole 
of experience, and more concrete than the abstract visions of both realism and 
nominalism.  Transcendental realism places the essential nature of particulars and 
fundamental principles in an a priori, other-worldly realm and nominalism fails to 
account for the more subtle kinds of experiences such as emotions, faith, or intuition.  In 
Kant’s philosophy, the result is a defense of the reality of the noumenal realm of essence 
and fundamental principles, and of the possibility of a priori knowledge, but the denial of 
experience’s capacity to come to know essential truth on the grounds that mere 
“perceptions without conceptions… are blind.”7  In Hegel’s philosophy, the result is an 
acceptance of fundamental principles as real, but a refusal to place their foundation in 
some other-worldly, noumenal realm, and therefore also a refusal to deny the experiential 
capacity of coming into contact with fundamental principles. 
                                                
7     Will Durant quoting Immanuel Kant, “Kant and German Idealism,” in The Story of Philosophy (New 





For idealists, experience does not correspond to the “Platonic understanding of 
activity as copying ideal models.”  According to Oakeshott, this view “has been 
overshadowed by a concept of ‘creative’ activity.”8  Rudolf Steiner, an idealist, explains: 
“Truth is not, as is usually assumed, an ideal reflection of something real, but is a product 
of the human spirit, created by an activity which is free…  The object of knowledge is not 
to repeat in conceptual form something which already exists, but rather to create a 
completely new sphere, which when combined with the world given to our senses 
constitutes complete reality.  Thus man’s… creativeness is an organic part of the 
universal world-process.”9  Unlike the image of man as the passive onlooker who 
observes or discovers an already existing truth that is complete in itself, in reality, man 
actually participates in the making of truth through cognition, the thoughts and concepts 
of which complete the world of the given.  In Oakeshott’s words, a ‘given’ “is not a mere 
gratuity; it is itself an achievement in understanding and not therefore (in its distinctness) 
independent of reflective consciousness.”10  The coherence of man’s experience “springs 
neither from a separately inspired moral sense nor from an instrumental conscience.  
There is, in fact, no external harmonizing power, insulated from the elements enjoying 
and in search of harmony.  What establishes harmony and detects disharmony, is the 
concrete mind, a mind composed wholly of activities in search of harmony and 
throughout implicated in every achieved level of harmony.”11  At first, this bold 
statement can come across as hubris for it may be understood as a denial of God.  It is 
                                                
8     Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1991), 512. 
9     Rudolf Steiner, Truth and Knowledge, ed. Paul M. Allen, trans. Rita Stebbing (Blauvelt, N.Y.: 
Steinerbooks, 1958), 11. 
10     Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 1. 




quite possible that it does in fact deny a conception of God as the source of this 
harmonizing power or order.  Yet it does place the burden of responsibility for moral 
conduct upon the shoulders of man, for if this assessment is correct, only man can be 
responsible for harmonizing his actions to moral standards set by his own conscience. 
 
Idealism suggests that experience is the ground of knowledge, and no experience 
should be denied.  Sensory experience is as much a part of the whole of concrete 
experience as is the kind of theoretical experience that makes contact with fundamental 
principles.  Somehow we must understand the underlying unity and harmony of all these 
seemingly contradictory experiences that make up the whole of experience, and see the 
whole that encompasses these conceptual oppositions.  Hegel suggested that the 
movement towards this goal is dialectic.  A limited experience will be opposed by a 
contradictory, yet also limited experience, but synthesis is then created by a more 
comprehensive experience that unites the previous two.  Another opposition to this 
synthesis then emerges and eventually synthesis is created again, and so on.  Such is the 
movement of thought that leads to increasingly refined conceptions of the world, the 
concrete whole or Absolute Knowledge always lying beyond the experiential horizon.  It 
might not be possible to achieve this bird’s eye view of the whole, but that is the criterion 
which satisfies true philosophical experience. 
 
British idealist R.G. Collingwood understood this to signify that the modes of 
experience in which we understand the world –art, religion, science, and history –are an 




encompassed by the following, more comprehensive mode, philosophy being the most 
comprehensive form of experience.  In the view of F.H. Bradley, these concrete 
experiences are not hierarchically related.  They do not dialectically oppose each other 
because they each carry their own specific postulates that cannot be carried over from one 
to the other.12  They are all (except philosophy) limited equally in that they are all 
abstractions from the whole of experience, but their respective values cannot be denied.  
They each offer a partial, yet relevant, view of the whole, and as such, contribute to the 
unity of this whole.  The philosopher’s engagement is in defining the limitations of these 
different kinds of experience in order to point continuously to a more concrete whole of 
experience.13  Oakeshott’s Experience and Its Modes is his attempt to do this.  In it he 
describes the nature of experience, the different modes in which one can experience the 
world, and their respective limitations, from a philosophical perspective. 
 
2- Experience and its Modes 
a) The Nature of Experience 
Before explaining the different modes of experience, Oakeshott discusses the 
nature of experience.  This concept is the stepping stone of his epistemology.  Experience 
is a concrete, unified, and whole phenomenon.  Rejecting the view that there is such a 
distinction between immediate sense experience and mediated thought experience, 
Oakeshott collapses experience into judgment or thought.  The two are essentially the 
same for there is no thought form that does not comprise judgment, and we cannot 
consider the experience we may have prior to, or outside of, consciousness, for such does 
                                                
12     W. H. Greenleaf, 10-11. 




not exist, experience is consciousness.  We can only explain the nature of experience as 
we are consciously aware of it, and what we can attest to is that all forms of experience 
are essentially thought, even though they may, at first, seemingly come across as mere 
sensorial blurts.   A more critical approach to the nature of experience suggests to 
Oakeshott that sensing something is impossible without the factor of judgment.  As soon 
as an image, a texture, a sound, or a smell appears, judgment is involved.  Thought is 
judgment.  This is blue; I hear a bell; this must be leather; the stars are beautiful.  No 
human contact with the world of particulars is made without the involvement of mind in 
which thought and therefore judgment are inherent. 
 
The popular distinction between sensory, immediate experience and mediated 
thought experience is based on a dichotomous illusion created by the intellect.  The 
intellect divides thought from sensation, cause from effect, subject from object, etc.  It 
cannot do otherwise.  Analysis is its way, and analysis dissects.  Intellectual analysis of 
the nature of cognition divides experience into immediate and mediate types, but this 
dichotomy is merely heuristic and an abstraction from reality.  The subject/object 
division is also an abstraction from reality.  Once this is recognized and the inherent unity 
of experience is re-established, one must abandon the view that there is such a distinction 
between immediate and mediate experience, and subject and object.  Experience is a 
unified whole.  Thought is as real as the sensory experiences of perception, feel, smell, 
and sound, because it is an integral part of experience as a whole.  Given that experience 





We come to know something through experience and experience only.  The 
concept of tabula rasa is not appropriate for the mind. 
Mind as we know it is the offspring of knowledge and activity; it is composed entirely of 
thoughts.  You do not first have a mind, which acquires a filling of ideas and then makes 
distinctions between true and false, right and wrong, reasonable and unreasonable, and 
then, as a third step, causes activity.  Properly speaking the mind has no existence apart 
from, or in advance of, these and other distinctions.  These and other distinctions are not 
acquisitions; they are constitutive of the mind.14 
 
Human understanding is always a movement from a given understanding to a more 
adequate understanding.  In Oakeshott’s terms, “understanding is not such that we either 
enjoy it or lack it altogether.  To be human and to be aware is to encounter only what is in 
some manner understood.”15  Nor is the assumption of a priori knowledge appropriate 
either.  According to Hegelian idealists, a priori knowledge is a false conception because 
it implies that something can be known independently of experience.  Kant’s 
epistemology, for instance, rests on the assumption that synthetic judgments, in which the 
concept of the predicate brings to the concept of subject something which lies completely 
outside the subject, can only be known a priori.  According to him, “Proper mathematical 
propositions are always judgments a priori, and not empirical, because they carry along 
with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by experience.”16  
However, if knowing stems from experience only, then mathematical propositions are 
somehow also known experientially and not in an a priori manner.  If, as idealism 
suggests, there is no such thing as a priori knowledge, Kant’s philosophical system falls 
apart.  Steiner explains why even mathematical propositions cannot be said to be known 
a priori and how all knowing is experientially based: 
                                                
14     Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, 109. 
15     Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, 1. 




For whatever object we are concerned to know, we must become aware of it directly and 
individually, that is, it must become experience.  We acquire mathematical judgment too, 
only through direct experience of particular single examples… even if we regard them… 
as rooted in a certain faculty of our consciousness.  In this case, we must say: This or that 
proposition must be valid, for, if its truth were denied, consciousness would be denied as 
well; but we could only grasp its content, as knowledge, through experience in exactly 
the same way as we experience a process in outer nature.  Irrespective of whether the 
content of such a proposition contains elements which guarantee its absolute validity or 
whether it is certain for other reasons, the fact remains that we cannot make it our own 
unless at some stage it becomes experience for us.17 
 
If experience is the only way one has to come to know something, if 'trying' that which 
we seek to come to know (for that is what the etymological roots of the word refer to, i.e. 
ex-periri, or what comes 'out' of the 'perils' of trial and error) is the only way, we have to 
give up the illusion of knowledge that is free of experience and somehow more pure for 
that matter. 
 
Eventually, Oakeshott replaced the concept of experience with that of imagining: 
“the self making and recognizing images, and moving about among them in manners 
appropriate to their character and with various degrees of aptitude.”18  In ‘imagining’, he 
found a way of accommodating the nature of poetic or artistic experience, while not 
losing the intellectual aspect of the concept of experience.  As such, the concept of 
imagining was capable of comprehending the non-intellectual activities of art and feeling.  
Imagining comprises all of the modes such as “sensing, perceiving, feeling, desiring, 
thinking, believing, contemplating, supposing, knowing, preferring, approving, laughing, 
crying, dancing, loving, singing, making hay, devising mathematical demonstrations, and 
so on…”19  Thus the worlds of thought were replaced by the worlds of images.  He 
                                                
17     Steiner, 33. 
18     Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, 496. 




specified that “these images are not ‘given’ or ‘presented’ to the self; they are not 
independent existences… because they are not anything at all out of relation to a self.”20  
Here we recognize the refusal of dividing experience into subject and object.  However, 
we should not understand this to signify that images are made by the self.  This would 
imply that no image or thought content conforms to anything outside the mind, turning 
Oakeshott’s world of imagining into an inescapably subjective, mind-dependent world, 
and ultimately denying the experience of the realist.  Oakeshott is not suggesting that 
individual minds create images willy-nilly, but that images “correspond to a specific 
mode of imagining” and that they always appear within a “world or field of images which 
on any occasion constitutes the non-self.”21  The nature of this modal kind of imaging or 
experience is what we now turn to. 
 
b) Modal Experience 
Experience is a world of ideas and in it there is “always the coordination and 
completion of a given world of ideas.”22  The ways in which we experience the world are 
innumerable, but several have become concrete enough to be distinctive ways of 
conceiving the world.  Oakeshott refers to the experiential modes of science, art or 
poetry, history, and practice, as the main modes of experience thus far evolved.  Each 
determinate mode carries its own set of postulates, and presents an internal coherence that 
is self-satisfactory, but as an arrest in experience, “there is no way in which an abstract 
world of experience can, as a world and as such, be seen to be a part of or a contribution 
                                                
20     Ibid. 
21     Ibid, 497. 




to the world of ideas ultimately satisfactory in experience, the world of concrete 
reality.”23  Each mode is an abstraction from the whole of experience and is limited due 
to its presuppositions.  What is problematic is that “each voice is prone to superbia, that 
is, an exclusive concern with its own utterance,” and may try to speak on behalf of the 
whole of experience.24  Modal experience is akin to arrested experience.  It stops short of 
seeing critically its own limitations, and understands itself as complete.  As such it is 
incapable of grasping the concrete whole.  Only the un-arrested experience of philosophy 
can do this.  This is the perspective from which Oakeshott seeks to determine the 
abstraction of a given mode.  In this endeavour, “what is relevant is not the degree of 
coherence which belongs to any world of experience, but whether or not that coherence is 
complete and unqualified.”25  Within a mode’s own world of ideas and postulates, it 
makes complete sense to itself, but as an arrested form of experience, it fails to elucidate 
concrete reality and satisfy experience as a whole.  It is also irrelevant to another mode of 
experience when the bearer of one seeks to convince the bearer of another about the 
nature of experience.  Before exploring the significance of this, let us briefly look at what 
Oakeshott means by the several, determinate modes of experience. 
 
i) The Mode of History 
The historical mode of experience looks at the past solely for the sake of the past.  
The real historian does not look at the past to find general laws of historical development, 
or to derive practical lessons from it, nor does s/he morally judge the past.  The practical 
                                                
23     Ibid, 213. 
24     Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, 492. 




mode will not do for true history, and the scientific and poetic approaches towards the 
past are as irrelevant to the historical mode.  This is not to say that a practical approach to 
the past is illegitimate.  Deriving lessons from the past is an important part of our 
practical experience, but it cannot be said to be history.  Any kind of historical 
abridgment will not do for the historian.  A general explanation of history would fail to 
satisfy the principle of historical coherence.  The historical past “is a world composed 
wholly of contingencies and in which contingencies are intelligible, not because they 
have been resolved, but on account of the circumstantial relations which have been 
established between them: the historian’s concern is not with causes but with 
occasions.”26 
 
To study history, one must account for change, neither in terms of cause and 
effect, nor in teleological terms by reading the present back into the past, but simply by 
delivering a full account of change.  “The relation between events is always other 
events.”27  “In the ‘historian’s’ understanding of events, just as none is ‘accidental’, so 
none is ‘necessary’ or ‘inevitable’.  What we can observe him doing in his characteristic 
inquiries and utterances is, not extricating general causes or necessary and sufficient 
conditions, but setting before us the events… which mediate one circumstance to 
another.”28  Any other kind of account does not constitute history.  “The ambition of the 
historian is to escape that gross abridgment of the process which gives the new shape a 
too early or too late and a too precise definition and to avoid the false emphasis which 
                                                
26     Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, 183. 
27     Greenleaf quoting Oakeshott, 28. 




springs from being over-impressed by the moment of unmistakable emergence.”29  His 
task is therefore “to create by a process of translation; to understand past conduct and 
happening in a manner in which they were never understood at the time; to translate 
action and event from their practical idiom into an historical idiom… to loosen the tie 
between the past and the ‘practical’ present.”30  However, the historical mode is an 
abstraction from the whole of experience because experience is always in the present.  
The inherent paradox involved in the historian’s present experience of the past, is what 
renders this mode an abstraction that falls short of comprehensive experience. 
 
ii) The Mode of Poetry 
Although Oakeshott initially thought of the world of art as part of the practical 
mode of experience, he later conceived of it forming its own mode of experience which 
he called poetry.  In the forms of painting, poetry, singing, sculpting, and writing novels, 
for instance, this kind of experience is contemplative, a kind of delighting in images that 
“are not recognized either as ‘fact’ or as ‘not-fact’, as ‘events’ to have taken place or 
not.”31  Here we should note that, by ‘contemplation’, Oakeshott is not referring to the 
Platonic contemplative disposition towards the world of essence.  Art is not the act of 
copying on canvas “an ideal model in the transitory materials of space and time.”32  The 
act of “poetic utterance (a work of art) is not the ‘expression’ of an experience, it is the 
experience and the only one there is.  A poet does not do three things: first experience or 
observe or recollect an emotion, then contemplate it, and finally seek a means of 
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expressing the results of his contemplation; he does one thing only, he imagines 
poetically.”33 
 
Its idiom is not purposeful like the practical mode of experience.  When painting, 
artists are not involved in the experience of communicating “an emotional experience 
designed to evoke this experience in others.”34  Nor can we approach poetic images 
morally, for these do not invoke approval or disapproval.  These would be practical 
experiences.  The real poetic experience is simply that of delighting in the world of 
images which “provoke neither speculation nor inquiry about the occasion or conditions 
of their appearing” but merely delight in their presence.35  “At every turn what impels the 
activity and gives it whatever coherence it may possess, is the delight offered and come 
upon in this perpetually extending partnership between the contemplating self and its 
images.”36  The mode of poetry is coherent in that it is a world of delighting, yet it 
remains an abstraction from the whole of experience because “there is no vita 
contemplativa; there are only moments of contemplative activity abstracted and rescued 
from the flow of curiosity and contrivance.”37 
 
iii) The Mode of Practice 
Of greater concern to us are Oakeshott’s practical and scientific modes: the 
practical due to its political offspring and the scientific due to Polanyi’s direct experience 
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of it and subsequent explanation of cognition based on this experience.  The most 
commonly experienced of the modes is that of practice which involves human conduct 
expressed in relation to the self.  “The coherence of the images of the practical world… 
springs from their being the creatures of desire” and aversion.38  “Practice is the exercise 
of the will; practical thought is volition; practical experience is the world sub specie 
voluntatis.”39  We give charity and pray to God for salvation.  In our economic life, we 
seek higher wages to solidify our financial security.  We pass a bill against child slavery 
which becomes law.  We join a political party.  In this mode, the “desiring self is engaged 
in constructing its world and in continuing to reconstruct it in such a manner as to afford 
it pleasure” and avoid pain.40  Each thought or image “is recognized as something to be 
made use of or exploited.”41  However, the mode of practice is also moral conduct, of 
which religion is the epitome.  “This moral attitude is concerned with the relations 
between selves engaged in practical activities…  there is a genuine and unqualified 
recognition of other selves… acknowledged to be ends and not merely means to our own 
ends.”42  “And when the dimensions of approval and disapproval are acknowledged, 
practical imagining is recognized as an activity whose object is to fill our world with 
images both desired and approved.”43 The sought for change is what is valued, and what 
is valued is valued by a community of individuals, and it is the “observation of a balance 
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of accommodation between the demands” of these desiring individuals that constitutes 
moral activity.44 
 
Change is emblematic of this mode.  Practical activity involves the constant allure 
of a better world ‘to be’.  Its purpose is to make the present world of ‘what is’ become 
this better ‘to be’.  A ‘better’ world implies a world more coherent than the existing one.  
In practical terms, coherence is viewed in terms of value.  Thus, “the ‘to be’ of practical 
experience is not merely that which is ‘to be’, but also that which it is believed is 
valuable or ‘ought to be’.”45  There is never a resting point in practical experience and the 
practical end of a better world can be achieved but is always met with eventual 
dissatisfaction for no later than action meets approval does the yearning for another 
‘ought to be’ awake —this is the endlessness of practical activity.46  For Oakeshott, its 
fundamental problem is that it “assumes a world of facts which is not merely susceptible 
of alteration, but which has change and instability as the very principle of its existence.”47  
It is for this reason that the mode of practice, when seen from the comprehensive 
perspective of philosophy, falls short of concrete reality.  A reconciliation of ‘what is 
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iv) The Mode of Science 
The scientific world of thought is “a system of conceptional images related to one 
another consequentially and claiming universal acceptance as a rational account of the 
world we live in.”49  It has “communicable intelligibility as the principle of its order.”50  
Unlike the mode of practice, scientific experience is understood not in relation to the self 
but “in respect of its independence of our hopes and desires, preferences and ambitions… 
the principle of this activity [being] the exclusion of whatever is private, esoteric, or 
ambiguous.”51  As such it is a world of “absolutely communicable experience”52 and 
“essentially a co-operative enterprise.”53  Scientific concepts lend themselves perfectly 
well to measurability.  The “master-conception [of scientific experience] is stability,” and 
its world is “conceived under the category of quantity.”54  The communication is absolute 
when quantity is being communicated.  Quantity cannot be misinterpreted, and as such is 
universal.  In fact, mathematics should be able to express all scientific propositions. 
 
The attitude of the scientist is impersonal and objective.  Of course, “desire and 
approval and even the expectation of pleasure have their place in the generation of this 
activity, but they do not enter into the structure of this universe of discourse as they do 
into the structure of the practical universe: pleasure is… only the self-congratulation 
which comes with the belief that one has been successful in this intellectual 
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undertaking.”55  However, this does not suggest that the scientific attitude is made neutral 
by way of methodological sovereignty.  Contrary to what positivism assumes, it is not the 
case “that the self in scientific activity begins with a premeditated purpose, a ready-made 
method of inquiry, or even with a given set of problems.  The so-called ‘methods’ of 
scientific investigation emerge in the course of the activity and they never take account of 
all that belongs to a scientific inquiry; and in advance of scientific thought there are no 
scientific problems.”56  ‘All that belongs to a scientific inquiry’ cannot be wholly 
formulated into rules.  It was in this context that Oakeshott referred to Polanyi’s work for 
a more comprehensive understanding of science.57  The practical and embodied aspects 
of knowledge involved in scientific activity are epistemologically prior to, and more 
important than, the formalities of method. 
 
In ascertaining whether scientific experience’s elucidation of reality is complete, 
and whether its character is satisfying to experience as a whole, Oakeshott suggests that 
the governing concepts of this world, i.e. communicability and quantity, are what 
preclude any attempt on behalf of science to establish a world satisfactory in experience.  
This is so because absolute communicability of the quantified implies a world of 
generalizations.  A generalization can never be categorically asserted for it is always an 
utterance of probability.  In other words, “the world of science is a world of supposals 
about reality,” thus never able to attain and make part of itself the concrete material of 
which it is about.  And so “Unless we know more about reality than what is explicit in 
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this world of judgments, we know nothing.”58  We should recall that for Oakeshott, what 
is satisfying to experience as a whole, what, for him, is the criterion of un-arrested 
experience, is coherence.  For him, “experience remains incomplete until the world of 
ideas is so far coherent as not to suggest or oblige another way of conceiving it.”59  To 
conceive of a world of ideas in sole terms of universal communicability and quantity is to 
fall short of the kind of coherence which begs for no other way of conceiving this world.  
Every scientific statement reduces the world of concrete experience to a set of 
mathematical generalizations, and as such is incapable of relating to experience as a 
whole. 
 
c) The Relationship between the Modes and the Significance of Modality 
Rejecting Collingwood’s understanding of the modes of experience as 
hierarchically related to each other, Oakeshott explains that such a view is possible yet 
false because it abridges reality by positing a causal antecedent to each mode.  To seek 
such an origin involves abstracting from the whole of reality an abridgment too limited to 
reflect coherent reality.  Each mode of experience has evolved independently.  Neither 
mode has engulfed previous modes and consequently taken a more comprehensive 
identity.  They are all equally satisfying to their respective postulates and they all fall 
short of totally comprehensive experience.  “Every mode of imagining is activity in 
partnership with images of a specific character which cannot appear in any other universe 
of discourse; that, is, each mode begins and ends wholly within itself.”60  That is why the 
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worst conversational mistake is to make an irrelevant statement.  If the postulates differ 
from mode to mode, there is no way in which the arguments and propositions of one 
mode can affect another’s. 
 
This does not forbid one to look at an object with different appropriate 
perspectives.  After all, one can look at a flower, delight in its poetic expression, then 
look at it scientifically, by inquiring into the process of photosynthesis, and then think 
about it in a practical manner, inquiring as to whether it is edible or not.  The moment of 
irrelevance is when the wrong approach is used for a given subject.  The “formal 
condition of every specific engagement to understand is that the identity to be 
investigated shall have been abstracted and composed in such a manner as to be 
categorially [sic] unambiguous, the word ‘category’ being used here in the strict sense of 
that which predicates the ‘order’ of the inquiry in which an identified ‘going-on’ may 
come to be understood.”61  Thus each ‘going-on’, or subject of inquiry, invites the 
observer to approach it in a distinct manner, forbidding any other that does not befit its 
category.  The most common moment of irrelevance is when we slip into the vocabulary 
or conceptualization of the practical, i.e. meant for prescriptive application to practical 
activity, from the premise of a mode or an ‘order of inquiry’ which cannot cater to the 
practical, such as history, art, or science.  In light of this thesis, the moment of irrelevance 
that concerns us is the currently inappropriate positivist approach to the study of politics 
which seeks to find universal laws of human political behaviour and to quantify political 
phenomena in order to predict future political events and tendencies.  Not only is this 
                                                




supposedly scientific approach foreign to this most practical, contingent and traditional of 
human activities, but it is also false on account of its underlying epistemological premise, 
which thinks of the mind as a blank slate upon which new and correct knowledge can be 
inscribed, and on account of its attempt to understand political activity in terms of a 
process, i.e. a non-intelligent ‘going-on’.  This will be discussed in detail below, but for 
the moment, it serves as an example of what Oakeshott means by irrelevance. 
 
The proper way to conceive of the relationship between these different modes of 
experience is conversationally.  A conversation is an exchange of insights from different 
perspectives.  The participants in a conversation are not involved in an activity of 
convincing or converting each other.  Such participants may at times engage in 
demonstration or argumentation, but these do not constitute a conversation.  In a 
conversation, “there is no ‘truth’ to be discovered, no proposition to be proved, no 
conclusion sought.”62  This is how the voices from different modes communicate 
amongst themselves without being irrelevant.  “The final measure of intellectual 
achievement is in terms of its contribution to the conversation in which all universes of 
discourse meet.”63  Contribution to this conversation is any coherent utterance made in a 
specific mode of experience.  In light of this, the role of education is to enable one to 
participate properly, without being irrelevant, in this great human conversation amongst 
the diverse voices of experience.  The concept of conversation denies the claim that all 
significant speech acts are inherently an inquiry into the essential nature of things or that 
they all have practical bearing.  The conversation in itself is more important than any 
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demonstration or argumentation.  It has a supremely civilizing effect in which “each 
voice learns to be playful [by not taking itself too seriously], learns to understand itself 
conversationally and to recognize itself as a voice among voices.”64  
 
d) The Comprehensive Experience of Philosophy 
 Unlike abstracted and arrested modal experience, philosophy is comprehensive 
experience, the disposition of which involves the perpetual ‘re-establishment of 
coherence’ and nothing less.  The “philosopher is never concerned with a condition of 
things but only with a manner of explanation, and of recognizing that the only thing that 
matters in a philosophical argument is its coherence, its intelligibility, its power to 
illuminate and its fertility.”65  Philosophy is not a body of knowledge or a self-enclosed 
system.  At the heart, philosophical thinking is the conversation with oneself,66 a way of 
thinking in which engagement with experience is critical throughout.  “There is no body 
of philosophical ‘knowledge’ to become detached from the activity of 
philosophizing…”67  The philosopher’s task is to achieve an increasingly comprehensive 
understanding of experience by means of delineating the respective limitations of each 
world of ideas.  It is “the impulse to study the quality and style of each voice, and to 
reflect upon the relationship of one voice to another.”68  This does not signify that 
philosophy positively contributes anything to the conversation amongst the modes.  If 
any contribution at all, it is negative in nature, delineating the purview of the modes to 
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ensure that one mode does not encroach upon another, let alone upon the whole of 
experience.  In light of this, theory is the result of the philosopher’s insight into the 
essential character of the determinate and indeterminate modes of experience 
encountered, and it is experientially based.  Its stamp of quality is comprehensiveness, for 
theorizing is the “resolve to inhabit an ever more intelligible, or an ever less mysterious 
world.”69 
 
3- Practical and Technical Knowledge 
Regardless of the world of thought or image we may be experiencing, coming to 
know something always comprises a mixture of practical and technical knowledge, 
although practical knowledge necessarily precedes technical knowledge.  Practical 
knowledge refers to that which “…exists only in use, is not reflective and (unlike 
technique) cannot be formulated in rules.”70  It is not learned but acquired through 
tradition, by having observed and imitated, by having been acquainted with a given world 
of ideas.  Likewise, it is not taught but imparted.71  Oakeshott quotes Chuang Tzu’s story 
about the books of the ancestors judged to be the “scum of bygone men” in order to 
describe the embodiment of practical knowledge.  Once the wise ancestors have passed 
away, the valuable part of their knowledge left with them, leaving behind only the scum 
of these bygone men in their books.72 
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Technique, on the other hand, can be learned simply by reading an instruction 
manual, a recipe book, or the rules of a game, but even these learning experiences 
comprise practical knowledge.  “Learning a technique… consists… in reforming 
knowledge which is already there.  Nothing, not even the most nearly self-contained 
technique (the rules of a game), can in fact be imparted to an empty mind; and what is 
imparted is nourished by what is already there.”73  Learning the rules of a game 
necessitates the acquired concept of what it means to play a game and what rules in 
general mean.  “We begin with what we know… and if we knew nothing we could never 
begin.”  Rules of a game or of any other activity “are mere abridgments of the activity 
itself; they do not exist in advance of the activity, they cannot properly be said to govern 
it and they cannot provide the impetus of the activity.”74  In short, technique almost 
always accompanies practical knowledge, but technical knowledge is not 
epistemologically necessary to any practice, and to deny this is to deny the creative 
capacity of the mind, for the activity of the mind is not determined by method.  
 
The problem lies in the fact that for some people, whom Oakeshott calls 
Rationalists, the practical aspect of knowledge does not stand for knowledge at all.  
Instead, the formulated certainty which technical knowledge seems to provide is 
abstracted from the whole of knowledge and taken as the only relevant kind of 
knowledge.75  Oakeshott explains how this comes to be: 
Each man engaged in a certain kind of activity selects a particular question and engages 
himself to answer this question…  And, with the normal neglect with which a man 
engaged upon a particular task treats what is not immediately before him, he supposes 
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that his activity springs from and is governed solely by his project.  No man engaged in a 
particular task has in the forefront of his attention the whole context and implications of 
that engagement.  Activity is broken up into actions, and actions come to have a false 
appearance of independence.76 
 
This is how we arrive at the false assumption that the proper premise of a given activity is 
a proper method, that without this method, the fruit of our activity is spoiled.  Yet we 
forget that our methods emerge from activity and not vice versa.  In this forgetfulness, we 
subject our perspective to the abstraction of technical knowledge, and ironically the fruit 
of our technical procedures are effectually abstract. 
 
Although we should not understand the following to be an attempt on Oakeshott’s 
part to posit the origins of rationalism for this would constitute an abstraction in itself, it 
is perhaps helpful to consider that “the Rationalist character may be seen springing from 
the exaggeration of Bacon’s hopes and the neglect of the skepticism of Descartes…” who 
in the end realized that all of knowledge could not be reduced to technique.77  As such, 
“modern rationalism is what commonplace minds made out of the inspiration of men of 
discrimination and genius.”78  This yearning for certainty and the belief that technique 
fulfilled this criterion constitutes a ‘gnostic’ intellectual fashion’ that was “certainly 
allied with a decline in the belief in Providence: a beneficent and infallible technique 
replaced a beneficent and infallible God; and where Providence was not available to 
correct the mistakes of men it was all the more necessary to prevent such mistakes.”79  
Technique seems to have brought a sense of control over the psychic chaos emerging 
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from the wreckage of religious belief systems.  Although this observation may not 
capture fully the intricate historical context in which what we now call rationalism may 
have risen, it nevertheless enables us to understand the underlying source of anxiety 
behind this attitude which permeates modernity and is very much present in the world of 
academia.  According to Oakeshott, academia has been subjected to the “invasion of 
every department of intellectual activity by the doctrine of the sovereignty of 
technique.”80  Relevant for this thesis is the realization that political studies departments 
have not been exempt from this development. 
 
The current approach to the study of politics seems to validate only technical 
knowledge.  For the Rationalist, this type of knowledge “not only ends with certainty but 
begins with certainty and is certain throughout.”81  Hence the emphasis on methodology 
and research design in political science.  However, “technical knowledge is never, in fact, 
self-complete, and can be made to appear so only if we forget the hypotheses with which 
it begins.”82  These ‘forgotten’ hypotheses emerge from traditional or practical 
knowledge that cannot be reduced to method.  A methodology can never be a complete 
form of knowledge because it cannot be understood apart from the tradition in which it 
emerged.  It is merely an abridgment, useful perhaps, but in no way self-sufficient.  The 
rationalist is under the false impression that an exact starting point is provided by 
method, and if one begins with the certainty of methodology, one’s results will therefore 
be certain.  However, what has been forgotten is the underlying reality that the judgment 
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which initially certified a given method to be certain came not from methodology or 
technical knowledge but from practical knowledge.  This is why methodology can never 
be a complete form of knowledge.  It rests on a far more vast and subtle field of 
traditional knowledge which can never be reduced to mere method.  In short, “the 
significance of Rationalism is not its recognition of technical knowledge, but its failure to 
recognize any other: its philosophical error lies in the certainty it attributes to technique 
and in its doctrine of the sovereignty of technique; its practical error lies in its belief that 
nothing but benefit can come from making conduct self-conscious.”83  In order to remedy 
this situation, we need to realize that technique is not the bearer of the certainty that we 
yearn to achieve, and more importantly, that certainty is a concept foreign to the practical 
world of politics. 
 
4- The Significance of Oakeshott to Political Studies 
 The implications of Oakeshott’s epistemology for the study of politics severely 
undermine the current, positivist conceptualization of the way in which politics ought to 
be studied.  His concepts of experience as unified and indivisible, and of practical 
knowledge, undermine the positivist illusion of objectivist, value-free, neutral, and 
certain knowledge, as well as its emphasis on methodology.  His explanation of politics 
as practical human conduct makes the study of it unapproachable from a quantifying 
perspective which seeks to reduce all political phenomena to laws and statistics.  Finally, 
his explanation of political education delimits the proper academic approach to politics to 
history and philosophy, and places the vocational approach outside the university context 
                                                




and in the practical world of politics itself.  The following is an explanation of these 
conclusions in greater detail. 
 
a) Human Conduct 
 What differentiates humans from other living organisms such as animals, plants 
and minerals is the kind of experience and cognition they are capable of.  Human conduct 
is not reducible to natural behaviour.  The concept of human behaviour is misleading 
because it reduces the whole of human experience to being governed solely by natural, 
universal laws.  Amoebas behave according to natural laws; plants and minerals also.  
Perhaps not even animals can be thought of as behaving solely on the basis of natural 
laws, as they themselves can demonstrate irregularities in their so-called behaviour.  
Humans, however, definitely do not behave.  They act on the grounds of human 
intelligence.   There is a world of difference between the concepts of behaviour and 
action.  To act implies a kind of endeavouring in traditional yet not wholly known 
territory, a territory in which laws of nature are not so much lacking as irrelevant.  Action 
signifies creativity, an ability to chart a path into an unspecified terrain.  In other words, 
human conduct is free, unless a situation of duress occurs, like slavery, bodily or 
otherwise. 
 
The Rationalist would have us believe that human conduct can be rational when it 
“[springs] from an antecedent process of ‘reasoning’” in which case man “must be 
supposed to have the power of first imagining and choosing a purpose to pursue, of 




wholly independent, not only of tradition and of the uncontrolled relics of his fortuitous 
experience of the world, but also of the activity itself to which it is a preliminary.”84  
According to Oakeshott, this view is false because of its underlying assumption that the 
“mind [is] an apparatus for thinking” which for him is “the error at the root” of this 
notion of rational conduct.85  As previously explained, for Oakeshott the mind is the 
‘offspring of knowledge and activity’: 
[Following] from this, it is an error to suppose that conduct could ever have its spring in 
the sort of activity which is misdescribed by hypostatizing a ‘mind’ of this sort; that is, 
from the power of considering abstract propositions about conduct.  That such a power 
exists is not to be doubted; but its prerequisite is conduct itself.  This activity is not 
something that can exist in advance of conduct; it is the result or reflection upon conduct, 
the creature of a subsequent analysis of conduct.86 
 
The nature of this conduct is effectively contingent and historical, subject to tradition.  It 
is learned from the very moment that a parent exerts discipline or instills values.  
Practices precede theoretical reflection on them and inform objectives, intentions, and 
purposes which would not exist without the context of the practice itself. 
 
In the different spheres of activity that comprise man’s life, his active conduct is 
appropriate to each.  There is a communal context in which human activity is conducted 
and this context varies from one community to another.  Change in conduct does occur, 
albeit slowly.  The conservative nature of tradition is ‘elastic’ enough to enable gradual 
change.  Revolution proper may occur on the surface, but the underlying traditional 
nature of conduct never disappears.  “[P]olitical crisis… always appears within a tradition 
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of political activity…”87  To understand the nature of this activity, one must approach the 
subject with all this in mind.  We are far from the naturalist conception of human 
behaviour in terms of chemical reactions in the brain or from the rationalist illusion of the 
nature of conduct.  We are in a world of historicity, contingency, and tradition.  Our 
disposition towards the kind of practical conduct we should like to understand must 
appreciate this. 
 
b) The Practical World of Political Conduct 
 Political phenomena belong to the practical mode of experience.  Desire and 
aversion, approval and disapproval, are the experiences through which political activity 
carries its tradition, and these experiences always relate to the self and are lived in a 
context of community.  For Oakeshott, politics is “the activity of attending to the general 
arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice have brought together… the 
communities in which this manner of activity is pre-eminent are the hereditary co-
operative groups… all of them aware of a past, a present, and a future, which we call 
states… the activity is one in which every member of the group who is neither child nor a 
lunatic has some part and some responsibility.”88  He prefers the concept of ‘attending to’ 
over ‘making’ arrangements because it forbids an understanding of political activity as 
purely empirical.  His understanding of politics denies that of the rationalist’s, i.e. the 
‘politics of the felt need.’  We do not go about making political decisions merely on the 
grounds of the moment’s desire, completely cut off from tradition.  Political “activity is 
never offered the blank sheet of infinite possibility.  In any generation, even the most 
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revolutionary, the arrangements which are enjoyed always far exceed those which are 
recognized to stand in need of attention, and those which are being prepared for 
enjoyment are few in comparison with those which receive amendment: the new is an 
insignificant proportion of the whole.”89 
 
Nor will an ideological understanding of politics do.  Any activity must be 
understood as ‘self-moved’.  By this Oakeshott means that it must be recognized as a 
“concrete whole… the source of its movement [lying] within itself.”90  To think of the 
source of political activity as lying in an abridged formulation of a whole political 
tradition is to abstract from the whole a vulgarized outline of a far more subtle, vast, and 
embodied tradition of human conduct.  Such an abstraction is untrue to the character of 
human activity.  Political “activity, then, springs neither from instant desires, nor from 
general principles, but from the existing traditions of behaviour themselves.”91  The 
implied contingency and idiosyncrasy of political activity forbids an approach that seeks 
to find universal laws that govern this realm of activity.  The practical world of politics is 
one of intimations and not certainties.  This activity takes the following form: 
[The] amendment of existing arrangements by exploring and pursuing what is intimated 
in them.  The arrangements which constitute a society capable of political activity, 
whether they are customs or institutions or laws or diplomatic decisions, are at once 
coherent and incoherent; they compose a pattern and at the same time they intimate a 
sympathy for what does not fully appear.  Political activity is the exploration of that 
sympathy; and consequently, relevant political reasoning will be the convincing exposure 
of a sympathy, present but not yet followed up, and the convincing demonstration that 
now is the appropriate moment for recognizing it.92 
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The least evil of solutions is intimated from the traditional and circumstantial nature of 
political activity.  “Politics is not the science of setting up a permanently impregnable 
society, it is the art of knowing where to go next in the exploration of an already existing 
traditional kind of society.”93  This is not the work of the engineer, but of the statesman.  
Weary of utopian ideals of perfection, the statesman seeks the least disruptive of 
solutions.  “Always so deeply veined with both the traditional, the circumstantial and the 
transitory,” political decisions are intimated, not calculated.94 
 
c) The Academic Study of Politics 
Education is “an initiation into the moral and intellectual habits and achievements 
of [one’s] society; an entry into the partnership between present and past, a sharing of 
concrete knowledge.”95  At the university level, education is meant to provide an escape 
from the practical considerations of life in order to point one’s attention towards the 
distinct voices of modal experience that have emerged in one’s civilization.  It involves 
an endeavour to come to know oneself and how to appropriately participate in the great 
conversation of mankind amongst the modes of experience.  “To be an undergraduate is 
to enjoy the ‘leisure’ which is denoted by thinking without having to think in pragmatic 
terms of action and talking without having to speak in terms of prescription or practical 
advice –the ‘leisure’, in short, which distinguishes the peculiar academic engagement of 
explanation.”96 
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Vocational studies, or the learning of skills, do not belong to university education.  
To learn a vocation one had best seek an apprenticeship with a practicing mentor, for if it 
is a practice one wishes to learn, there is no better way than to embark the ship and learn 
in practice.  University education, on the other hand, is not such a learning experience.  In 
Oakeshott’s terms, it is one of “‘languages’ rather than ‘literatures’… it is concerned with 
the use and management of explanatory languages (or modes of thought) and not 
prescriptive languages.”97  In other words, there is implied in university education the 
encounter with a given culture, its diverse ‘languages’ here meaning the modes of 
experience in which this culture or civilization has come to express itself in its 
understanding of the world rather than the specific content which it produces.  University 
education invites the student to engage with explanatory rather than prescriptive 
languages because the latter belong to the practical world of experience.  University 
education is an invitation to escape this practical world to which prescriptions belong.  
Instead, “what undergraduates may get at a university, and nowhere else in such 
favourable circumstances, is some understanding of what it is to think historically, 
mathematically, scientifically or philosophically, and some understanding of these not as 
‘subjects’ but as living ‘languages’ and of those who explore and speak them as being 
engaged in explanatory enterprises of different sorts.”98  University education is thus a 
learning experience into which a student is invited in order to shed momentarily the 
practical concerns of everyday life and listen in on the conversation between the different 
explanatory perspectives of his or her civilization. 
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The rationalization of education has emphasized the utilitarian goal of fashioning 
students for the workforce.  According to Oakeshott, “perhaps the most serious rationalist 
attack upon education is that directed against the Universities.  The demand for 
technicians is now so great that the existing institutions for training them have become 
insufficient, and the Universities are in process of being procured to satisfy the 
demand.”99  If we can speak of a dictatorship of the practical mode of experience, we 
must understand that what empowers it are “the prejudices and preconceptions of the 
larger part of mankind, who find it impossible to entertain the idea that this practical 
world, within which they are confined as if in a prison, is other than the universe 
itself.”100  To constantly push students to exercise their creativity in churning out 
prescriptive solutions to practical problems is to forbid them the possibility of learning 
the different modes of thinking that compose this conversation.  
 
According to Oakeshott, the texts brought forth to students should be amenable to 
learning about the various modes of experience.  “In a university education, a ‘text’ is 
understood, not as an organization of information but as the paradigm of a ‘language’.  
Consequently… some ‘literatures’… are in a more appropriate condition to be studied, or 
offer a clearer paradigm of the ‘language’ concerned…”101  The cannons of proper 
historical, philosophical, scientific, and poetic expression should be the studied texts.  
The practical mode of experience, in its various forms such as law, politics, and religion, 
should be studied philosophically or historically and not vice versa.  There is no practical 
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approach involved in university education, for this implies a vocational approach which 
belongs elsewhere.  However, it becomes difficult to trace the line when it comes to the 
subject of politics.  Being so practical in nature, politics has a tendency to invite its 
observer to see it practically.  It is easy to slip into the mode of practice when 
endeavouring to give a historical account of a given political phenomenon or when 
philosophically trying to understand the activity. 
 
The proper academic approaches to the study of politics must, on the one hand, be 
amenable to the given subject, and on the other, respond to the university purview of 
teaching students how to properly experience the several modes.  “If there is a manner of 
thinking and speaking that can properly be called ‘political’, the appropriate business of a 
university in respect of it is not to use it, or to teach the use of it, but to explain it –that is, 
to bring to bear upon it one or more of the recognized modes of explanation.”102  This not 
only denies the possibility of studying politics in a vocational manner, but also from the 
poetic and scientific modes of thought.  The academic study of politics does not lend 
itself to poetry, of which the experience of delighting in a world of images is not 
explanatory in nature and therefore inappropriate for university education.  This does not 
negate the possibility of seeing politics poetically; it simply places this possibility in a 
context that is appropriate to it.  For instance, Oakeshott notes that “in ancient Greece 
(particularly in Athens) ‘politics’ was understood as a ‘poetic’ activity in which speaking 
                                                




(not merely to persuade but to compose memorable verbal images) was pre-eminent and 
in which action was for the achievement of ‘glory’ and ‘greatness’.”103 
 
Nor is science the proper approach to the study of politics for when science 
carries over into the world of practical considerations, it loses its ability to “[pass] into 
the world of abstractions in which alone it can fully satisfy itself.”104  In other words, 
science ceases to be science when catering to questions of practical relevance, in which 
case it becomes technology.  We must recall that, for Oakeshott, the world of science is 
that which is “understood in respect of its independence of our hopes and desires, 
preferences and ambitions…” and this world is “a system of conceptional images related 
to one another consequentially and claiming universal acceptance as a rational account of 
the world we live in.”105  On the other hand, the world of practice is that which is 
dependent on our hopes and desires, does not compose a world of images related 
consequentially but contingently, and which, contrary to claiming universality, is 
contextually limited to locality.  We must make the distinction between the subjects of 
inquiry that belong respectively to the worlds of science and practice.  The latter 
presupposes human conduct which in turn expresses ‘reflective intelligence’, i.e. capable 
of self-understanding and making choices.  Science, on the other hand, inquires into 
processes, the nature of which does not exhibit human reflective intelligence. 
[T]he understanding of identities recognized as themselves exhibitions of intelligence 
cannot be ‘reduced’ to the understanding of identities not so recognized…  And the 
contention that all exhibitions of intelligence may themselves be understood as examples 
of the operation of ‘laws’ (psychological or sociological) of human understanding 
recognized as itself a ‘process’ is vetoed by the consideration that the theoretical  
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engagement in which such ‘laws’ might be formulated must (within the terms of the 
contention) also be understood as an example of the operation of the same ‘laws’, which 
is categorially absurd.106 
 
In other words, we cannot be led to believe that the laws that govern non-intelligent 
processes, e.g. physico-chemical laws, also govern the act of theoretical engagement.  
Furthermore, “there can in fact be no ‘scientific’ attitude towards the past, for the world 
as it appears in scientific theory is a timeless world, a world, not of actual events, but of 
hypothetical situations.”107  Such an approach is therefore also ill-disposed for the study 
of politics on the grounds of the latter’s inherent historicity. 
 
 In short, the attempt to understand politics from the scientific mode is irrelevant.  
And to think that we have established a proper scientific study of politics because we 
have adopted scientific methods such as analysis, verification, hypothesizing, and 
modeling is to delude ourselves because “none of it has served (or is even designed) to 
set us on to some other questions than the essentially ‘vocational’ questions… And much 
of it (because it has come to be concerned with imaginary ‘systems’ and ‘processes’, 
‘powers’, ‘establishments’ and élites, stereotypes of one sort or another) diverts our 
attention from the often irregular character of political organizations and events, and thus 
makes our ‘vocational’ education less good than it might be.”108  Oakeshott’s diagnosis 
thus only approves the historical and philosophical approaches to the study of politics, of 
which we now turn to. 
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i) The History of Politics and Political Ideas 
In an academic context, where practical prescriptions should not be considered, 
political activity can be approached historically due to the inherent historicity of political 
existence.109  A proper historical account of political activity and ideas must not judge 
from a limited, contemporary perspective the relevant facts to bring forth.  Every 
historical fact must be taken as is, without the intrusion of contemporary values.  For 
example, a historical approach to Machiavelli cannot involve moral judgments about his 
ideas; it should simply describe them in order to deliver the most complete intelligibility 
possible on the subject matter.  It would also be out of place to judge that Plato’s ideas 
were precursors to fascism, communism or neo-Kantianism for this would be reading the 
present back into the past and would therefore not constitute historical experience.  The 
“ground for excluding moral judgment from ‘historical’ inquiry and utterance is not the 
difficulty of agreeing upon a standard to apply, nor the alleged absence of evidence, but 
the observation that to pronounce upon the moral value of conduct, and the imposition of 
a moral structure upon the past, represents the incursion of a practical interest into the 
investigation of the past.”110    
 
The texts to be analyzed by undergraduate students in such a historical context 
should of course relate to political experience, but their pedagogical value lies in the fact 
that they invite the students to acquaint themselves with the historical mode of 
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experience.  “Merely to extend our studies backwards a little way into the past in order to 
account for a piece of political conduct is not ‘doing’ history; it is indulging in a piece of 
retrospective politics which makes certain that the historical mode of thinking never 
properly appears.”111  Oakeshott recalls Alexis de Tocqueville’s L’Ancien Régime as a 
good example of history.  In it the character of the French Revolution is exhibited “not as 
the necessary and inevitable consequence of preceding events, but as an intelligible 
convergence of human choices and actions.”112 
 
ii) Political Philosophy 
The concept of political philosophy at first posed a problem for Oakeshott.  
Unlike the determinate modes elaborated previously, he deemed political philosophy, and 
ethics and moral philosophy for that matter, to be indeterminate modes of experience due 
to their lack of internal coherence.  He did not think they were instances of 
comprehensive philosophical experience because their focus was a limited aspect of 
experience.  This is why he thought of these worlds of thought as pseudo-philosophy, i.e. 
philosophical but not fully comprehensive to constitute true philosophy.  He later altered 
his view and considered political philosophy to be “what occurs when [the] movement of 
reflection  [about political life] takes a certain direction and achieves a certain level, its 
characteristic being the relation of political life, and the values and purposes pertaining to 
it, to the entire conception of the world that belongs to civilization.”113   Its purpose is to 
theorize on the postulates of political activity, not to be politically engaged.  In no way is 
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it amenable to normative and prescriptive application to the practical world of politics.  
One cannot philosophize from a practical standpoint such as politics because the practical 
perspective is an abstraction from the whole of experience.  From an educational 
perspective, the study of political philosophy is an invitation to learn the experience of 
philosophy via the subject of politics. 
And when in the writings of Plato or Hobbes or Rousseau or Hegel or Mill what is being 
looked for is the political disposition of these writers, when expressions like ‘natural law’, 
‘general will’, ‘freedom’, ‘the rule of law’, ‘justice’, or ‘sovereignty’, which, 
philosophically speaking, are explanatory concepts, whose explanatory value might have 
been explored, are turned… into prescriptive concepts, and when what is reflected upon is 
merely their injunctive force, all chance is lost of learning something about the 
philosophical mode of thought.114 
 
d) The Current State of Political Studies 
Rationalism is what characterizes the current approach to politics, both academic 
and vocational.  Not only is it inappropriate for the study of this practical activity, but its 
identification as science is inappropriate as well.  “The heart of the matter is the pre-
occupation of the Rationalist with certainty.  Technique and certainty are, for him, 
inseparably joined because certain knowledge is, for him, knowledge which does not 
require to look beyond itself for its certainty; knowledge, that is, which not only ends 
with certainty but begins with certainty and is certain throughout.”115  The result of this 
pre-occupation with certainty is a discipline suffering an identity crisis and choked by 
methodology.  The rationalist is under the illusion that the sought-for certainty is to be 
found in methodology, but the sovereignty of method destroys theoretical relevance.  
Consequently, the rationalist study of politics is incapable of ‘looking beyond’ the model 
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method (in this case, the model assumed to be the natural sciences) and producing much 
more than an abundance of methodologically relevant facts. 
 
We have seen with the help of Oakeshott’s concept of practical knowledge that 
one’s way towards coming to know something is not wholly reducible to rules, or method 
for that matter.  In fact, the “precise formulation of rules of inquiry endangers the success 
of the inquiry by exaggerating the importance of method.”116  This goes for any kind of 
knowledge.  The self-identification of rationalist political studies as a science is therefore 
not only illusory on the grounds that the practical aspect of scientific knowledge has been 
denied, but also because the practical mode of politics is not amenable to the mode of 
scientific thought.  Oakeshott’s distinction of the practical mode of experience as 
circumstantial, historical, contingent, and traditional, forbids an approach seeking precise 
formulation.  Oakeshott speaks of ‘intimation’ as the proper disposition towards the 
understanding of politics.  This does not entail that one’s approach should not be critical; 
it is meant to highlight the forgotten and crucial practical aspect of political knowledge.  
To learn it vocationally, one must thus enter the world of politics, observe, learn from a 
mentor, and practice it.  Eventually, solutions to political problems will be intimated to 
the apprentice by the political tradition at hand. A crib sheet on the rules of conduct may 
help, but will definitely not suffice. 
 
What has occurred in the university is a confusion of sorts.  The vocational 
disposition was adopted in many departments in order to respond to societal pressures 
                                                




and problems, i.e. what Oakeshott would refer to as the practical idiom taking over.  
Education became a training of sorts.  In political science departments, practical solutions 
to political problems were sought and defended.  This vocational approach would not 
necessarily have been so problematic were it not for the fact that the positivist attitude 
towards the study was adopted as well.  Perhaps to legitimize themselves, or maybe to 
weed out the activists, rationalist scholars adopted an approach ill-disposed to the study 
of politics without knowing what they were really doing.  As scholars of politics, they 
were arguably not as attentive to the underlying epistemological assumptions of the 
proposed rationalist methods as philosophers of science would more likely have been, for 
instance.  Not only is a real vocational approach therefore prevented from taking place, 
but also truly historical and philosophical approaches to the study of politics are 
prevented as well. 
And if it is said that the manner in which ‘politics’ is taught in universities has not 
forbidden a connection with history and philosophy, the reply must be that the connection 
is often resented as a diversion from the proper concerns of ‘political science’, and that 
wherever it has been made it has been apt to be corrupting rather than emancipating… 
‘History is patronizingly admitted so long as it remains in the ‘background’ (whatever 
that may mean).  And ‘philosophy’ appears, not as a manner of thinking but as a misused 
word to identify what is believed to be a certain kind of interest in politics.117 
 
Indeed we have ‘far to go’, as Oakeshott suggests, in order to restore a proper academic 
approach to the study of politics.  Yet the fact that the work of such philosophers as 
Oakeshott is presently taught in political science departments is perhaps an indication that 
the prospects of such a restoration are not as bleak as we may assume them to be.  
Oakeshott offers two suggestions as to how a restoration may be attempted. 
First, in a School of ‘Politics’ we should never use the language of politics; we should 
use only the explanatory ‘languages’ of academic study…  And secondly, since in a 
university we should regard ourselves as supervising, not the study of ‘texts’ understood 
                                                




as organizations of information, but the study of the use of explanatory ‘languages’ in 
connection with appropriate ‘texts’, these ‘texts’ should be chosen with care and for the 
relevant (pædagogic) reasons.118 
 
This would properly allow only for the historical and philosophical explanatory 
approaches to the study of politics in academia.  One may wonder if, at this point, it is 
perhaps too late for such a restoration to take place.  After all, the rationalist view of how 
politics should be studied is quite entrenched, albeit for a few departments which have 
purposefully kept their traditional approach towards the nature of university education.  Is 
the rationalist disposition here to stay?  Perhaps it would help us to recall Oakeshott’s 
philosophical premise, i.e. idealism, in the pursuit of an answer to this question.  If we 
know through experience, the answer must consider the nature of the rationalist’s 
experience.  Oakeshott suggests that this experience is characterized by a concern with 
certainty, which may be historically contextualized by the decline in the belief in an 
‘infallible’ God.  Thus an infallible technique was sought, perhaps in order to restore a 
kind of psychological balance or peace of mind. 
 
If this account of experience is remotely accurate, then we cannot expect the 
rationalist disposition to give way until the implicit anxiety involved in the rationalist 
experience is resolved experientially.  Ironically, the more the rationalist places 
confidence in the certainty of technique, the more he will likely experience the psychic 
anxiety of uncertainty.  This is so because the practical aspect of knowledge is denied.  
To deny the validity of practical knowledge is to cut oneself off from the traditional roots 
of one’s existence.  Without tradition, there is no existential anchor, and consequently 
                                                




what is experienced is chaos and the loss of one’s sense of familiarity with the world.  
We must note, however, that experience is never completely void of tradition.  As 
Oakeshott argues, activity is always occurring within an already existing, traditional flow 
of activity.  What is problematic, however, is the celebration of the rationalist experience 
as progress.  The rationalist disposition will likely remain intact as long as this perception 
of progress holds.  Yet rationalism, as an ‘intellectual fashion’ is likely to give way 
eventually to the traditional, and far more concrete, flow of practical knowledge.  The 
underlying positivist assumptions of rationalism cannot sustain the house of cards that its 
ideology represents, for the illusory epistemological foundation on which it stands has 
denied the most important aspect of knowledge.  Without practical knowledge, what is 




Part II: Michael Polanyi’s Epistemology and its Import for the Study of Politics 
 
1- Michael Polanyi’s Epistemological Premise 
We have seen that the tradition of thought known as realism acknowledges the 
existence of an essential realm of being, and that humans have the capacity to make 
contact with it.  It is in light of this perspective that Polanyi develops his epistemology.  
Contrary to the claims of nominalists, realists argue that concepts are more than merely 
heuristic tools or contrivances of the mind that serve to organize our thoughts.  They are 
portals through which mankind obtains insights into reality, envoys from the stable world 
of essence, sent to the receptive mind.  Furthermore, this hidden essential reality that 
exists beyond the world of the given as we perceive it is not mind-dependent.  This is 
what distinguishes the realist from the idealist who refuses to place essential being in an 
other-worldly, a priori, external realm.  The implied relationship of interdependence 
between truth and experiential knowledge in the idealist's perspective is unacceptable to 
the realist.  How can man be co-creator with God?  To place man in such light is 
tantamount to hubris.  For the realist, it is crucial that the realm of essence should not be 
conceived as dependent on human experience.  We speak of the divine with the 
foreknowledge that there is a realm of pure being that is independent from us.  If this 
realm were of this concrete reality which we know with our senses, we would not have 
the transcendental experience of it as subtle and hidden behind the given that we see, nor 
would we have the experience of Grace.  This does not, for that matter, make it 
impossible to come into contact with the essential realm of being, or truth.  The fact that 




activity of the mind is to come to know what lies “behind” the world of the given and 
communicate this discovery to others, even though there may not always be a receptive 
audience.  In light of this, we must understand the role of theory not as merely a record of 
our experience, but as a vehicle capable of taking us beyond experience.  This explains 
how some scientific theories were capable of shedding light on deeper and never before 
experienced levels of reality.  It is in this light that man expresses his true creativity 
(which in reality has nothing to do with the creation of truth, as relativists would suggest, 
but should be understood as one's capacity to discover truth), which flourishes most at the 
point when he is capable of transcending his subjectivity in order to get a glimpse of 
reality and relate it objectively to others. 
 
This capacity to make contact with the real, to discover truth, is made possible by 
virtue of one's personhood.  We can recall that Kant, though he belonged to the idealist 
tradition of thought, had refused the notion that we can come into contact with the 
essential realm through mere experience, which for him, implied immediate sense 
experience.  ‘Perceptions are ‘blind’ without conceptions’, he thought.119  Only a priori 
knowledge enables contact with the noumenal order because it is free of the biasing, 
experiential, human factor.  We can denote in Kant’s vision the modern epistemological 
concern with subjectivity and the underlying anxiety to achieve objective knowledge.  In 
opposition to Kant, Hegel had refused the division of experience into immediate sense 
experience and its mediate conceptual counterpart.  Why posit the notion of immediate 
sense experience if there are no percepts without concepts?  Experience is a unified 
                                                




whole, is thought, and as such, is capable of making contact with essence, which is not in 
some other-worldly realm, but very much part of our concrete world of experience.   
 
For Polanyi, knowledge is human knowledge, embodied and experientially 
derived.  This nullifies the Kantian notion of strictly a priori knowledge.  Man would 
indeed be blind to the hidden order behind the given were he to rely solely on immediate 
observations (if this were possible at all), but it is not by somehow bypassing his 
experience, however immediate it may be, that he can claim a conceptual vision of truth.  
“Our conceptual imagination, like its artistic counterpart, draws inspiration from contacts 
with experience.”120  The embodied premise of all acts of knowing precludes the 
possibility of a priori knowledge.  Man “must inevitably see the universe from a centre 
lying within [himself] and speak about it in terms of a human language shaped by the 
exigencies of human intercourse.”121  We shall see that, for Polanyi, any act of knowing 
involves the experiential process of 'subsidiarizing' aspects of the particulars of the whole 
one yearns to comprehend.  The embodied aspect of this development and the 
transformation of self involved preclude the notion that knowledge could ever be 
disembodied and therefore free of experience. 
 
Nevertheless, man is capable of transcending sense experience.  Polanyi cites the 
Copernican, heliocentric perspective as an example.  Defying the daily observation of the 
sun, moon, and stars rising in the East and setting in the West, and the subsequent 
experience of thinking oneself to be at the center of the universe, the heliocentric system 
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was nevertheless more objective and intellectually satisfying than Ptolemy's perspective, 
even if theoretically more abstract and experientially more difficult to sustain.  However, 
the perspective offered from a point of theoretical transcendence is still held from the 
center of one's personhood.  As such, we have “abandoned the cruder anthropocentrism 
of our senses, but only in favour of a more ambitious anthropocentrism of our reason.”122  
One may distinguish, for the sake of description, between sense experience and 
theoretical or conceptual experience, but both inherently presuppose the person.  Perhaps 
this brings Polanyi closer to Hegel than Kant, but Polanyi is not an idealist.  As a realist, 
he must be faithful to the notion that the hidden reality behind the given is independent 
from, and external to, man's experience.  This faith in the hidden order behind the world 
of particulars may be understood as a leap of faith on his part, yet this should not mean 
that it is therefore irrational.  Polanyi would say that it is indeed a fiduciary act to uphold 
his convictions as a realist, but these are held reasonably.  Now it should be noted here 
that 'reality' for Polanyi is of two kinds.  According to Prosch, there is, for Polanyi a) the 
“reality as that which exists independently of us, and b) those realities continually being 
expanded by the creative capacities of man in his efforts to attain broader and more 
moving meanings.”123  It is in reference to the first kind that we need to understand 
Polanyi's realism whereas the second kind should not be taken to imply any relativism on 
his part.  In Polanyi's words, “An empirical statement is true to the extent to which it 
reveals an aspect of reality, a reality largely hidden to us, and existing therefore 
independently of our knowing it.”124  The implied creative element in idealism is an 
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affront to a realist's sensitivity towards the realm of the divine and even signifies 
arrogance.  When transcending his subjectivity, man does not experience his own 
creation but an objective truth to which he must remain faithful in his rendering of it. 
 
Notwithstanding the differences Polanyi has with nominalists and idealists, he is 
most in opposition with positivists, or in his words objectivists.  It was to rectify their 
mistaken assumptions about knowledge and their false ideal of objective detachment that 
he elaborated his concept of tacit and personal knowledge.  Polanyi's works are dedicated 
to re-acknowledging the self as the ground of knowledge, “to re-equip men with the 
faculties which centuries of critical thought have taught them to distrust.”125  His main 
critique is against the positivist or objectivist conception of personal detachment from the 
knowing process.  His point is that the personal coefficient is a constant throughout the 
whole knowing process.  It is impossible to achieve neutral knowing.  Acts of appraisal 
made by the person are continuously made throughout any given process of 
understanding.  “Even the most strictly mechanized procedure leaves something to 
personal skill in the exercise of which an individual bias may enter.”126  The positivists’ 
resentment of the human cognitive element, their anxieties about subjective bias as well 
as their idealization of exact and neutral knowledge, and finally their subsequent faith in 
the sovereignty of method have led them to deny the very ground of knowledge that is the 
human self.  Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge, the fruit of a personal experience which 
suggested to him that knowledge always presupposes the self, is his way of countering 
this anti-human ideology and restoring the self as the ground of knowledge.  All 
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knowledge is human and incarnate knowledge, and to deny this, as the positivists 
ultimately do, is to subject oneself to the tyranny of methodology and forsake the mind. 
 
This concept of 'personal' knowledge does not render knowledge inescapably 
subjective, which is what Kant was worried about, and which many critics of Polanyi 
suggest.  In response to Kant, Polanyi would say that man is vested subjectively and 
passionately in the discovery process but nevertheless responsible for, and capable of, 
testifying objectively to aspects of the real which he discovers.  The “act of knowing 
includes an appraisal; and this personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, 
bridges in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity.  It implies the 
claim that man can transcend his own subjectivity by striving passionately to fulfil his 
personal obligations to universal standards.”127  With Hegel, Polanyi would agree that 
there is no sense in positing knowledge that is free from experience, in the sense that 
every act of comprehension is achieved by experiential subsidiarization of particulars, but 
he would stop short of implying that human beings are necessary participants in the 
making of truth.  For Hegel, nothing can be rationally said to be understood that is 
completely independent of an understanding consciousness.  Hence man is co-creator of 
truth.  For Polanyi, we must accept the otherness and independence of the realm of 
essence from the human mind.  Man does not create Truth, he discovers it.   
 
2- Personal Knowledge: A Theory of Being 
Here we come to the realization that Polanyi’s epistemology must become a 
theory of being.  If the ground of knowledge is the self, we need to inquire as to what it is 
                                                




about the self that enables understanding.  It is a fairly recent idea that knowledge 
epistemologically precedes being.  This view is epitomized in Descartes' maxim ‘I think 
therefore I am’.  However, the Cartesian maxim is a modern reversal of the way in which 
the relationship between knowledge and being was conceived in earlier days.  Upon 
hearing Descartes, Plato would have responded: I am therefore I think.  I am human, and 
by virtue of my humanity, of what it truly means to be human, I am capable of knowing. 
 
For Polanyi, knowledge is always grounded in personhood.128  He understands the 
person to be a being who has emerged from lower forms of life and has evolved into 
increasingly higher forms of consciousness.  Man is a being endowed with 'centers of 
activity' the consciousness of which cannot be determined by the lower physico-chemical 
structures of his being.  His whole person cannot be specified wholly from such a level.  
The individual that he is conscious of being (the 'I am') is an autonomous centre of 
consciousness that cannot be reduced to its particulars.  Polanyi therefore cannot accept 
the neurological model of consciousness.  Instead, he suggests that: 
… the spectacle of anthropogenesis, confronts us with a panorama of emergence; it offers 
massive examples of emergence in the gradual intensification of personal consciousness.  
At each successive stage of this epic process we see arising some novel operations not 
specifiable in terms of the preceding level; and the whole range of them is unspecifiable 
in terms of their inanimate particulars.  For no events occurring according to the known 
laws of physics and chemistry can be conscious.129 
 
We have here a view of man as conscious being, emerging from lower forms of life 
throughout his evolution, yet not wholly determined by these.  This “gradual 
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intensification of personal consciousness” is exemplified well in Voegelin's interpretation 
of the Socratic experience: 
The [mystic philosopher's] discovery of the new truth [about the order of the soul] is not 
an advancement of psychological knowledge in the immanentist sense; one would rather 
have to say that the psyche itself is found as a new center in man at which he experiences 
himself as open toward transcendental reality.  Moreover, this center is not found as if it 
were an object that had been present all the time and only escaped notice.  The psyche as 
the region in which transcendence is experienced must be differentiated out of a more 
compact structure of the soul; it must be developed and named.  With due regard for the 
problem of compactness and differentiation, one might almost say that before the 
discovery of the psyche man had no soul.  Hence, it is a discovery which produces its 
experiential material along with its explication; the openness of the soul is experienced 
through the opening of the soul itself.130 
 
It is by virtue of this process of differentiation, or emergence, that man has eventually 
come to carry the 'powers' necessary to perceive order and rationality in nature.  It is 
important to take note of Polanyi's understanding of emergent personhood firsthand, for 
this will provide the backdrop to his epistemology.  We shall see that the leap across the 
logical gap which characterizes discovery, as well as all acts of understanding, are also 
unspecifiable in terms of the preceding formalized maxims and methods.  Furthermore, it 
entails that for us to enter the perspective offered by Polanyi's concept of 'personhood' we 
must be willing to question the hold which our cultural conditioning has on us through 
our sustained belief that all of our levels of experience are reducible to physico-chemical 
determinations.   
 
 Now, given that everyone is a person, we may ask ourselves how knowledge 
varies from one person to another.  Knowledge varies not in the way it is achieved, for 
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this is the same for everyone:131 it has two dimensions, tacit and focal.  For now, let us 
say that the kind and degree of knowledge one can achieve varies according to 
experiential differentiation.  Here is the Heideggerian element in Polanyi's thought.  
There is a quality to be ascribed to personhood, which differs from one person to another 
according to the extent to which the higher aspects of this personhood are integrated.  
Everyone is endowed with personhood, just by virtue of being human, but consciousness 
varies from person to person.  It is through the experiences of life, and education in the 
classical sense of the turning around, that one comes to integrate higher centers of 
personhood.  For the ancients, knowledge was not only conceived as grounded in the self, 
but more specifically, the way in which the self lives.  One’s love of the divine Sophon 
and disposition towards Dike were understood by Plato as necessary for making contact 
with the real.  The ‘good life’ and good judgment depended on one being just in mind, 
body, and soul.  All this depended on the quality of one's being, as exemplified by Plato's 
metaphor of the copper, silver, and gold people of his republic.  Polanyi upholds this 
tradition and also borrows from Heidegger in his endeavour to explain that knowledge 
depends on the quality of one’s way of ‘being in the world’.132 
 
 The classical conception of education, or periagoge, reflected this and meant a 
transformation of the self which involved a refinement of this quality of ‘being in the 
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world’.  We can recall the inspiring words set in stone at Apollo’s temple, ‘Know 
Thyself’.  This was a call to take on this transforming experience in order to discover the 
full extent of one’s being, the true order of the soul.  It involves a mind-opening 
experience which makes one more receptive to increasingly subtle realms of the real, but 
it depends on one’s receptivity to such an experience, it depends on how one already is in 
the world.  We shall see that there is a morality embedded in his epistemology, expressed 
in the contemplative disposition one can adopt towards the divine and the responsible act 
of commitment required for discovery.  We should keep in mind that Polanyi was 
devoutly Christian, and the implied values are imbued throughout his perspective. 
 
 The pedagogical 'turning around' towards the right order of the soul will 
necessitate the key element of respect towards tradition and authority, as well as the 
fiduciary element that comes epistemologically prior to knowledge.  The student, in order 
to come to know a subject more profoundly, must submit to the authority of one who 
carries the tradition of his practice in the belief that he or she can learn from this mentor.  
“To learn by example is to submit to authority.  You follow your master because you 
trust his manner of doing things even when you cannot analyse and account in detail for 
its effectiveness.”133  This is not to suggest there is no room for critique or challenge.  
Polanyi thinks that entwined with submission to authority is its counter-position of revolt 
or challenge.  No good mentor would forbid any form of challenge coming from his 
student.  Nevertheless, for any knowledge to be communicated there needs to be a certain 
receptivity on the part of the student.  This is what is implied by submission to the 
                                                




authority of the mentor.  For this to take place, however, the student must believe that this 
can and will occur. 
 
 What actually goes on in the relationship between student and mentor is that, in 
the daily presence of his or her mentor, while observing his or her actions and hearing his 
or her logical arguments, the student will absorb tacitly the knowledge that is being 
communicated to him.  It is not due to a crib sheet, or a rulebook, or a textbook, that most 
knowledge will be transmitted.   “An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be 
transmitted by prescription, since no prescription for it exists.  It can be passed on only by 
example from master to apprentice.”134   Education and knowledge transmission has very 
little to do with textbooks or methodology.  This view of education does seem to fly in 
the face of our current educational system.  Perhaps most educational programs rely 
heavily on textbook abbreviations and methodological handbooks of operation.  There is 
a concern about transmitting exact knowledge which the pedagogical administrators do 
not want jeopardized by the personal bias of the teacher.  As such, teachers are motivated 
by formulaic exam success rather than the transformation and discovery of self inherent 
to the concept of periagoge.  Furthermore, the over-emphasis on the need to doubt and 
critique all forms of knowledge put before the student prevents the kind of openness 
necessary to embark on a journey of comprehension.  Students are told firsthand that they 
must question for themselves, doubt and put all material to critique.  A balanced dose of 
this would not do any harm, but the objectivist understanding of critique will actually 
prevent true understanding from taking place, for an act of comprehension is essentially 
a-critical and fiduciary. 
                                                





a) The Fiduciary Element: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy 
 Fundamental and inherent to this tacit nature of knowledge is the cognitive power 
of belief.  It may puzzle one to think of belief as the foundation of any act of 
comprehension.  One need simply look at the mission statements of pedagogical 
institutions to take note that one of their main goals is always to 'produce' critically 
minded individuals.  Rarely are we invited to believe first, and then critique, in order to 
come to know something.  Yet Polanyi insists on the fiduciary source of all acts of 
knowing.  This is what he was referring to in the subtitle of his Personal Knowledge: 
Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.135  Our first reaction to Polanyi's 'fiduciary 
programme' might be hostile.  We may feel we have been duped too long by the belief 
systems that have sustained long held prejudices, superstitions, and charlatanry of every 
sort, and that our protection against such erroneous explanations of reality lies in our 
ability to doubt, critique, and be skeptical.  How can we accept the concept of 'belief' as 
epistemologically necessary for any act of understanding after all our efforts to rid 
ourselves of unfounded belief systems?  At this point in time, when the concept of faith 
seems for many to be an antiquated experience, how can we agree with Polanyi that “we 
must now go back to St. Augustine... [who] taught that all knowledge was a gift of grace, 
for which we must strive under the guidance of antecedent belief: nisi credideritis, non 
intelligitis”?136 
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 For Polanyi, belief is the source of all knowledge.137  This is so because we 
inhabit and are shaped by a fiduciary framework which is impossible to experience from 
without.  This framework comprises the whole of our “tacit assent and intellectual 
passions, the sharing of an idiom and of a cultural heritage, [and] affiliation to a like-
minded community...”138  In other words, all of our specific assertions are made from 
within the given belief systems that both inhabit us and in which we inhabit at any given 
historical moment.  Polanyi suggests that we now need to restore the balance between our 
twin cognitive powers of faith and knowledge.139  To do so would alleviate the psychic 
tension created by the contradiction we experience by upholding the principle of 
objectivist doubt while realizing that the premises of our supposedly demonstrable 
statements are in fact unspecifiable and rest ultimately in our belief of these premises.  
“Innocently, we had trusted that we could be relieved of all personal responsibility for 
our beliefs by objective criteria of validity...”140  The restoration of a proper balance 
between faith and knowledge would require that we entrust ourselves with the capacity to 
judge with intelligence the beliefs we choose to carry and subsequently to take on the 
responsibility of upholding these vital beliefs.  Our disillusionment towards the capacity 
of such external criteria to validate our beliefs will make us “realize that we can voice our 
ultimate convictions only from within our convictions –from within the whole system of 
acceptances that are logically prior to any particular assertion of our own, prior to the 
holding of any particular piece of knowledge.”141  Let us take for example the moment a 
child attempts their first dive.  As long as there is doubt in the child's mind about the 
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feasibility of diving, no dive will be attempted.  The moment this child believes s/he can 
dive, a dive will ensue.  Of course a certain getting used to the idea of diving, getting 
comfortable in and around the water, the diving board, etc. is involved.  Belief operates 
within reasonableness and as such is rational, but as a cognitive power, belief has the 
ability to quell the doubt that prevents the leap across the logical gap which separates the 
state of not knowing from that of knowing.  The fiduciary act is difficult because it 
implies the abandoning of the firm ground we know as well as risk and uncertainty. 
 
 To suggest that belief is the source of all knowledge points to the paradox of 'self-
set standards'.  “If the criteria of reasonableness, to which I subject my own beliefs, are 
ultimately upheld by my confidence in them, the whole process of justifying such beliefs 
may appear but a futile authorization of my own authority.”142  If we know by first 
believing, and belief is tacit and unspecifiable, how can there be any reasonable measure 
with which one can determine what is true?  To this Polanyi reaffirms the necessity of 
accrediting our capacity to judge intelligently.  “Only this manner of adopting the 
fiduciary mode is consonant with itself: the decision to do so must be admitted to be itself 
in the nature of a fiduciary act.”143 This would mean that our ultimate ground for 
knowing something is in fact ourselves.  We can only know for ourselves and from our 
deepest convictions. 
In the last resort my statements affirm my personal beliefs, arrived at by the 
considerations given in the text in conjunction with other not specifiable motives of my 
own.  Nothing that I shall say should claim the kind of objectivity to which in my belief 
no reasoning should ever aspire; namely that it proceeds by a strict process, the 
acceptance of which by the expositor, and his recommendation of which for acceptance 
by others, include no passionate impulse of his own.144 
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Thus everything we hold to be true is upheld, not by virtue of external criteria of validity, 
but by our passionate belief in its truth.  The real criteria are actually self-set standards of 
reasonableness.  The unspecifiability of the underlying assumptions on which supposedly 
external criteria stand precludes their personal detachment and objective, neutral status.  
Everywhere, mind is involved both passionately and intelligently, and all of our acts of 
understanding presuppose a personal leap of faith.  After all his attempts to explain why it 
is that the personal element of knowledge is always present, after all his examples to 
point to this, the only foundation Polanyi can stand on is his belief in what he is trying to 
convey. 
 
b) Commitment: Resolving the Subject/Object Divide 
 
 With this in mind, it is hard to understand how Polanyi's epistemology does not 
fall in line with relativism.  If all knowledge relies ultimately on belief because the 
underlying assumptions of our diverse “methods” for acquiring any given knowledge are 
inherently unspecifiable, this means there is no possibility of proof, no means of 
demonstrating, and possibly no objectivity whatsoever.  Polanyi argues that his 
perspective is saved from this by the act of commitment.  That the person is at all times 
participating in the process of understanding, and that every act of understanding is 
supported by belief, do not mean that man is incapable of being objective.  
“Comprehension is neither an arbitrary act nor a passive experience, but a responsible act 




contact with a hidden reality; a contact that is defined as the condition for anticipating an 
indeterminate range of yet unknown (and perhaps yet inconceivable) true 
implications.”145  Here Polanyi wishes to clarify what the true sense of objectivity means, 
as opposed to the positivist outlook which suggests that it means free of personal bias, or 
neutral, or value free.  Polanyi clarifies: 
I think we may distinguish between the personal in us, which actively enters into our 
commitments, and our subjective states, in which we merely endure our feelings.  This 
distinction establishes the conception of the personal, which is neither subjective nor 
objective.  In so far as the personal submits to requirements acknowledged by itself as 
independent of itself, it is not subjective; but in so far as it is an action by individual 
passions, it is not objective either.  It transcends the disjunction between subjective and 
objective.146 
 
We need to keep in mind that Polanyi is a realist of sorts.  For him, the concept of 
objectivity refers to one's capacity to relate responsibly aspects of reality which one has 
come to know.  “Personal knowledge is an intellectual commitment,” he says.147  “The 
inherent structure of this fundamental act of personal knowing makes us both necessarily 
participate in its shaping and acknowledge its results with universal intent.  This is the 
prototype of intellectual commitment... [which] is a responsible decision, in submission 
to the compelling claims of what in good conscience I conceive to be true.”148  It is by 
introducing the concept of belief in the light of commitment, by 'merging' belief into “the 
wider framework of commitment,” that Polanyi suggests personal knowledge is 
safeguarded from relativist 'self-destruction'.149 
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 The difference between belief and commitment would thus seem to be that belief 
or faith is epistemologically necessary for knowledge yet not capable on its own to 'link' 
the knower to the other end of the 'pole' that is the essence of the thing known.  By 
believing, one opens one's heart center150 towards that which is sought to be known, but it 
is by committing oneself to this act that one 'brings together' or links both the individual 
and the universal poles of personal knowledge.  Being committed implies the willful 
pledge to carry out fully one's calling to come to know the essential nature of that which 
one has judged reasonable to believe.  This implies that man is capable of being 
responsible in the manner he attempts to convey to others the reality which he has caught 
a glimpse of, by staying true to the essence of that which he has grasped.  For this 
however, he must commit himself to what he says, which of course brings upon him the 
risk of incurring critique and opposition from his colleagues.  We can be honest with 
ourselves, as students and scholars, and admit that we often change the wording of our 
papers in order to make them appear more objective and to make ourselves less liable to 
finger-pointing.  We tone it down so to speak, and as soon as our passion erupts, we are 
told to make our words more 'objective'.  We often stay out of our very own work.   Yet 
“no sincere assertion of fact is essentially unaccompanied by feelings of intellectual 
satisfaction or of a persuasive desire and a sense of personal responsibility.”151  Thus for 
instance, in the practice of mathematics, where, of all places, we would expect assertions 
to be entirely free of personal involvement, the usage of the assertion sign ' ' actually 
signifies that one commits him or herself to the given assertion.  As Polanyi writes, “it is 
not the act of my uttering a sentence p that I express by '  . p' but the fact that I believe 
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what the sentence p says.  The correct reading of '  . p' written down by me in good faith 
is therefore 'I believe p', or some other words expressing the same fiduciary act...  The 
symbol and the phrase convey in their respective terms the personal endorsement of the 
sentence prefixed by them.”152  It is our own commitment that enables us to grasp hidden 
reality.  It is a responsible act which implies that one is adhering to self-set standards of 
universal intent.  These two poles of all acts of understanding, personal participation and 
universal intent, are bridged by the act of commitment, which resolves the subject/object 
dichotomy by making possible a fusion or human grasp of essential truth. 
 
c) Sensus Communis: The Social Backdrop to Belief and Commitment 
 
 The individual's quest for knowledge occurs within a fiduciary social framework.  
Thus truth claims are adjudicated according to the sensus communis of the community of 
inquiry to which one belongs.  Again, Polanyi's epistemology risks falling prey to 
relativism.  If it is impossible to see from without the social framework one is born in, 
how can we tell whether the truth claims upheld by one's community are relative or 
universal?  Polanyi is conscious of the risk, and refers to a comparative example of the 
mystical Zande and naturalist European interpretative frameworks in order to illustrate 
the same circular logic that characterizes them both, thus implying the relativity of truth 
claims.153   Borrowing from anthropologist Evans-Pritchard's study of the Azande, 
Polanyi cites that they “reason excellently in the idiom of their beliefs... but they cannot 
reason outside, or against, their beliefs because they have no other idiom in which to 
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express their thoughts.”154  This is just as characteristic of our Western framework: “Our 
objectivism, which tolerates no open declaration of faith, has forced modern beliefs to 
take on implicit forms, like those of Azande.  And no one will deny that those who have 
mastered the idioms in which these beliefs are entailed do also reason most ingeniously 
within these idioms, even while – again like Azande – they unhesitatingly ignore all that 
the idiom does not cover.”155  Just like the Azande ignored all the facts pointed to by 
Evans-Pritchard which negated the Zande mystical interpretation of the use of snake 
poison by an oracle, so does each and everyone of us ignore all that our respective idiom 
does not cover.  Now this should mean that all truth claims are in fact relative, that 
therefore there is no universal standard with which to judge truth claims for there is no 
way of escaping our social fiduciary framework, but Polanyi does not allow for this.  He 
suggests that even though the community of inquiry in which we inhabit does adjudicate 
the truth claims to which we commit individually, our ability to commit personally to the 
quest of the real signifies the universal horizon of personal knowledge.  
 
3- Tacit and Focal Knowledge 
   Polanyi regards knowing as “an active comprehension of the things known, an 
action that requires skill.  Skilful knowing and doing is performed by subordinating a set 
of particulars, as clues or tools, to the shaping of a skilful achievement, whether practical 
or theoretical.”156  Knowing is an action because it presupposes a willful intention.  It is 
spurred by the whole spectrum of lower to higher passions of the human being.  It is 
skillful because it implies the whole range of human achievements down to the very 
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beginnings of our dexterity, linguistic achievements, and logical capacities.  In every 
learning achievement, we come to a point where enough of the particulars (of the whole 
that comprises the learning achievement in question) have been subordinated or 
embodied so as to enable us to leap across the logical gap that entails the learning 
achievement.  The subordination or embodiment of particulars is the tacit or 
unspecifiable process by which we come to know something without needing to refer 
specifically to its particulars in order for us to conceive of, or grasp, the whole.  It is 
important to note that we cannot equate Polanyi's conception of tacitness with 
unconsciousness.  “While focal awareness is necessarily conscious, subsidiary awareness 
may vary over all degrees of consciousness.”157  Being tacitly 'aware' points to the 
inability to specify and articulate formally what we are conscious of, not that we are 
unconscious of the particulars. 
 
 The more we dwell in the particulars of a given whole, the more difficult it is to 
recollect and bring to surface those particulars, but we are conscious of our dwelling in 
them nonetheless.  Eventually, we come to a point where all that we know cannot be put 
into words.  “We may then be said to become 'subsidiarily aware' of these particulars 
within our 'focal awareness' of the coherent entity that we achieve.”158  Gradually, our 
awareness of the particulars that make up the whole we wish to take hold of is such that it 
subsides into the deep recesses of our being so that we may focus specifically on the 
learning goal in question.  For example, we can recall our first attempts at hammering in 
a nail.  The knocks were most likely awkward and perhaps painful.  It is as though the 
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hammer had not yet become an extension of our hand and arm.  It was held with our focal 
attention not yet capable of going beyond the hammer.  Eventually, with practice, the 
hammer became almost invisible to our senses because we had subsidiarized its utility, 
which became an extension of our hand.  With greater precision we were able to hone in 
on the nail.159   
 
 As such, subsidiarization is a process of embodiment:  
Our subsidiary awareness of tools and probes [i.e. of particulars] can be regarded now as 
the act of making them form a part of our own body.  The way we use a hammer or a 
blind man uses his stick, shows in fact that in both cases we shift outwards the points at 
which we make contact with the things that we observe as objects outside ourselves.  
While we rely on a tool or a probe, these are not handled as external objects.  We may 
test the tool for its effectiveness or the probe for its suitability, e.g. in discovering the 
hidden details of a cavity, but the tool and the probe can never lie in the field of these 
operations; they remain necessarily on our side of it, forming part of ourselves, the 
operating persons.  We pour ourselves out into them and assimilate them as parts of our 
own existence.  We accept them existentially by dwelling in them.160 
 
We should note that this 'pouring oneself out' into the particulars and 'dwelling in' them 
not only occurs at the physical level, as in the example of hammering, but is also 
conceptual.  “When we accept a certain set of pre-suppositions and use them as our 
interpretive framework, we may be said to dwell in them as we do in our own body.  
Their uncritical acceptance for the time being consists in a process of assimilation by 
which we identify ourselves with them.”161  As such, we can say that our minds must also 
come to dwell in the particulars of that which we wish to understand.  Theoretical vision 
is thus also characterized by that same 'pouring out into' and 'dwelling in' the particulars 
of that vision.  However we should not take this to mean that, somehow, the activity of 
the mind is disconnected from the body.  Polanyi traces the personal coefficient of 
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knowledge to “its roots in the subsidiary awareness of our body as merged in our focal 
awareness of external objects.”162  The more subtle achievements of understanding that 
occur at higher levels of personhood are embodied as well. 
 
 Polanyi's epistemology in this sense is phenomenological.  The 'clues and tools' or 
particulars of a given act of comprehension “are made to function as extensions of our 
bodily equipment and this involves a certain change of our own being.”163  It is as though 
man were capable of becoming or entering that which he is seeking to know.  A fusion of 
sorts occurs between subject and object (which, as we shall see later, depolarizes the 
subject/object divide).  The French have an expression which portrays this fusion well, 
albeit in a possibly negative way: déformation professionelle.  It becomes increasingly 
difficult to perceive things from without the professional framework one has eventually 
become fused with.  After years of dwelling in the particulars of one's profession, one 
sees everything from the perspective of that profession, unable to extract oneself from 
those particulars. 
 
 The tacit nature of embodied knowledge implied by this phenomenological 
epistemology is such that we can summarize parts of our knowledge about certain things 
into maxims and rules, but the underlying art of that which we know how to do cannot be 
formalized and specified as such.  Maxims “can function only... within a framework of 
personal judgment.”164  Without the personal coefficient, maxims and rules of an art are 
meaningless.  It is the intelligent judgment of an individual that generates the focal 
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awareness which then gives meaning to the rules and maxims.  One of Polanyi's 
examples is how we know how to swim.  Even if one does not know the 'mechanics' of 
swimming, such as how the inflated lungs prevent one from sinking, one can still know 
how to swim.  The “aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of 
rules which are not known as such to the person following them... Rules of art can be 
useful, but they do not determine the practice of an art; they are maxims, which can serve 
as a guide to an art only if they can be integrated into the practical knowledge of the art.  
They cannot replace this knowledge.”165  This is so because knowledge is experientially 
derived and experience is of a tacit nature.  A technical instruction manual on swimming, 
or any other practice for that matter, cannot transmit the art of the practice in question 
even if it highlights well the principles by which the practice works. 
 
 Only the experience of the practice or the subsidiarization of its particulars, which 
presupposes the participation of the person, is carrier of knowledge.  The underlying 
inarticulate and unspecifiable nature of experience is as such: 
… the usual process of unconscious trial and error by which we feel our way to success 
and may continue to improve on our success without specifiably knowing how we do it –
for we never meet the causes of our success as identifiable things which can be described 
in terms of classes of which such things are members...  Subsidiary or instrumental 
knowledge... is not known in itself but is known in terms of something focally known, to 
the quality of which it contributes; and to this extent it is unspecifiable.166 
 
Thus it is impossible to come to know something in a predetermined and specifiable 
manner, i.e. by strict rules of procedure and methodological frameworks.  The 'groping' 
manner in which we make our way towards any given learning goal precludes this 
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possibility.  Instead, we come to know something by tacitly subsidiarizing the particulars, 
the meaning of which comes to light only in the context of the whole we focus on. 
 
4- The Significance of Polanyi to Political Studies 
 
 This rendering of the nature of understanding points the way to a post-critical 
philosophy of knowledge.  In order to know, we must first believe.  Secondly, it signifies 
that any attempt to reduce to rules or maxims all parts of the understanding process is 
futile.  Given that there is always a tacit component to knowledge and/or skills, and given 
that this tacit component is embodied in one's personhood, one cannot summarize into a 
methodology what is not specifiable.  Methods will of course have their respective place 
in many areas of knowledge gathering, but these methods will be subordinate to the tacit 
acts of understanding made by the person in his or her given area of knowledge.  One will 
use the appropriate methods in order to arrive at one's respective goal, but one will not let 
a methodology dictate the course.  A method can never be wholly responsible for the act 
of understanding.  Thirdly, it signifies that the fact/value distinction we always make is 
also unfruitful.  Given that one's personhood is a constant throughout the understanding 
process, acts of personal appraisal are the backbone of the advancement of knowledge.  
To appraise is to judge, and to judge implies an evaluation.  To ascribe factuality to a 
piece of information, an observation, or measurement, is to value this clue as a fact.  It is 
evidence to our eyes because we have ascribed its evidential character ourselves.  Finally, 
the concept of objectivity appears in a new light.  It no longer refers to neutral, value free, 




universal intent, being fully aware that our person is wholeheartedly vested at all points 
of our knowing process.  Intellectual passion is our way towards discovery, and in no 
way is passion dispassionate. 
 
 To the study of politics, Polanyi's epistemology signifies that our adherence to 
what we think of as 'scientific' standards is misguided by our false notions of science.  Let 
us first retrieve the etymological roots of this concept.  'Science' comes from the Latin 
word for seeing, 'scioscire'.  Now, seeing does not have to be taken literally.  Seeing can 
be through imaginative creativity, theory, or conceptualization.  This is insightful because 
we realize that in all fields of expertise, all academic disciplines, and all attempts to come 
to know something, some sort of 'seeing' is at hand.  More importantly, there is no one 
method to 'seeing' properly.  Of course methods will vary from field to field, but these 
methods will respect the subject matter at hand.  Polanyi's work serves to redress the 
misconception we have inherited from positivist perspectives of science.  His mission 
was to re-acknowledge the self as the ground of all understanding, that the self is tacitly 
involved in all acts of comprehension.  This corrects the misconception we have about 
science in particular and knowledge in general. 
 
 Science is not some sort of depersonalized, value-free, objectivist domain of our 
intellect, just as all knowledge is not these things as well.  Therefore, in political 'science' 
the correction we can first make is to reject our assumption that, by means of proper 
methodology, we can have neutral research results.  It is not only a mistaken assumption, 




human meaning.  This void can then be filled by utilitarian means-to-ends arguments that 
do not consider the human factor in all its meaningfulness, i.e. moral, social, ethical, 
emotional, and psychic, for example.  Our results can then be administered in full 
acceptance of their 'unbiased' character, but can also be administered in outright 
opposition to human ethical codes of conduct.  By giving up the idea that, by using the 
proper methodology, we can somehow make our research value-free and therefore 
unbiased, we allow ourselves to appraise the quality of our human judgments about 
political things.  By acknowledging our capacity to come to know our subject matter 
tacitly, we free ourselves from the stranglehold of methodology and the ensuing 
overproduction of irrelevant political facts which occurs when theoretical relevance is 
subordinated to method.  Furthermore, by acknowledging the powers of the mind implied 
by Polanyi's concept of emergence, we increase these powers.  The more we deny our 
intuitive capabilities by barring them with methodological and measurable constraints, 
the less these powers will be exercised.  We cut the roots off our very own qualities by 
putting all faith in methodology.  We have basically outsourced our cognitive powers to 
methodology. 
 
 Finally, the significance of Polanyi's epistemology to political studies is that, by 
uncovering the illusion of scientific methodology, we let go of the insecurity we feel 
about the legitimacy of our field of knowledge.  We have increasingly relied on the 
supposedly 'scientific' method in order to legitimize ourselves amidst all our academic 
fields and in response to our cultural bias in favour of the scientific perspective, not to 




time to look into the mirror and be honest about the self-serving cycle this has generated.  
We get more funding for popular research subjects if we promise measurable results, and 
then, because of these results, we get more legitimacy along with further funding and the 
subsequent publication of even more research results.  This is not to say that there is no 
room whatsoever for statistical analyses or polling surveys within our field.  It is to say, 
instead, that our strict reliance on methodology constricts our level of understanding by 
delimiting the acceptable in terms of the measurable.  This puts out of our field of 
research all metaphysical concepts.  This is due to the positivist understanding of 
knowledge and reality we have come to accept.  For the positivist, anything that is not 
observable by measurable technique, anything that is metaphysical in nature, does not 
belong to respectable academia.  This is simply an erroneous view of reality. 
 
 All this begs the question of what approach we would move towards.  First of all, 
it is not all political science that is subject to positivism, nor is it all political philosophy 
that is free of positivism.  Nonetheless, were we to commit ourselves to a real assessment 
of the underlying assumptions that guide our current methodological bias towards the 
study of politics, and realize that these assumptions are inherently positivist and illusory 
on account of Polanyi's rendering of the nature of knowledge, we could possibly consider 
a phenomenological approach to our subject matter.  This would obviously not require 
any specific method, although this is not to say that appropriate methods would not 
emerge either.  Polanyi’s understanding of personal knowledge as a tacit embodiment of 
one's subject matter would imply we consider entering our subject matter and making our 




particulars of the whole it is we wish to comprehend.  This would occur at a practical 
level, whereby a student would apprentice him or herself to a given politician with 
significant political experience.  It would also occur in academia, where another student 
would do so with political philosophers.  Nothing is new here.  We would simply need to 
inspire ourselves from the traditional pedagogical approaches we were accustomed to 
before the onslaught of all pedagogy by positivism.  Lastly, a Polanyian approach to 
political studies would entail that we focus once again on the whole and the essence 
which we seem to have lost sight of for the most part, i.e. a political science elevated to 
its full meaningfulness, which Eric Voegelin had rightly recognized as “the science of 
human existence in society and history, as well as of the principles of order in general,” 
and as a science of “the order in which human nature reaches its maximal 
actualization.”167  What seems to have happened in political science is that we became so 
preoccupied with our methodological standards that we have lost sight of the whole 
which first ignited our curiosity.  In order for us to refocus on the whole, we need to 
consider seriously the implications of Polanyi's epistemology, understand the illusion of 
depersonalized knowledge, and be honest with ourselves. 
                                                




Part III: A Comparative Critique of Michael Oakeshott's and Michael Polanyi's 
Epistemologies 
 
 We now have the accounts of the two philosophers' epistemologies, one rooted in 
the concept of personhood, the other in the nature of experience as a unified whole.  Both 
philosophers present us with the necessary explanations for the reasons why our current 
approach to political studies is not tenable.  Let us recall that the destruction wrought by 
positivism consists in the subordination of theoretical relevance to method.  This perverts 
the meaning of science as all facts are considered viable scientifically if they submit to 
method.  Furthermore, the erroneous fact-value distinction we make and the subsequent 
illusion of the necessity of a “value-free” science of politics come from the positivist 
conceit which dogmatically denies the metaphysical dimension of human experience.168  
Consequently, we search for laws of political behaviour because we think that human 
conduct is reducible to the physico-chemical level.  We try to emulate what we have been 
misled to think the natural scientists do because we have lost the meaning of theoretical 
relevance and therefore think that the criterion for science is method.  We doubt our 
cognitive powers to the point where, we not only let method control insight but, 
farcically, we make our creative insights fit the model method we have chosen to adopt 
ex post facto, so that the method justifies our insight. 
 
 Polanyi has offered us the concepts of subsidiary and focal knowledge in order to 
explain why knowledge can never be disembodied and therefore supposedly “value-free” 
and objectivist.  Likewise, we have understood from Oakeshott's concepts of practical 
                                                




and technical knowledge that the approach we have adopted regards only technical 
knowledge as valid, and that such a rationalist stance is illusory due to the inherently 
practical nature of knowledge.  Thus both philosophers are relevant to the study of 
politics on account of these concepts.  This assessment may seem like an 'un-committed' 
sitting on the fence.  However, I also have to say that these philosophers complement 
each others' thought.  My arguments are that: a)  their respective concepts of practical and 
subsidiary knowledge achieve the necessary correction to our misconceived ideal of 
disincarnate and rationalist knowledge, even if, in my view, Polanyi's explanation of 
subsidiarity achieves this more successfully; b) while Polanyi's realism is a much needed 
correction to relativism, Oakeshott's idealism is more comprehensive; c) because 
Polanyi's fiduciary programme is untenable, Oakeshott's experiential framework, 
however omniscient it may seem to some, is more attuned to our present experience; and 
yet, d) Polanyi's elucidation of the cognitive powers of the mind brings us closer to a 
restorative endeavour in the science of politics. 
 
1- The Significance of Practical and Tacit Knowledge 
 
 We have seen that the practical and subsidiary nature of the way in which 
knowledge is gained signifies that our neuroses about methodological exactitude are 
unfounded.  It is not the method or the “technical rule” that ensures the act of discovery 
or the sought-for certainty of knowledge.  In fact, nothing can ensure these.  The fact that 
knowledge is rooted in one's personhood means that discovery depends on the quality of 
that person.  Knowing is therefore dependent on the extent to which one undergoes 




approach that characterizes modernity's way of handling the unknown is an illusion.  We 
seek certainty of outcomes and think this will be obtained because we have the certain, 
exact method.  In reality, we can only come to know something in practice.  It is by a 
sustained effort at getting acquainted with the other –whether this other is a discipline, an 
art, or a technique –by the everyday contact with it and dwelling in the particulars of that 
which is not of the self, that one comes to know things.  This has been explained in 
greater detail previously, but suffice it to say here that both Oakeshott's and Polanyi's 
concepts of practical and tacit knowledge signify to the study of politics that our 
underlying epistemological assumptions need a major revision. 
 
 The reason why I think that Polanyi's concept of subsidiarity achieves this 
revision more successfully is somewhat akin to William Poteat's assessment of 
Oakeshott's rendering of the concept of experience.  He says of the latter that “One 
almost never has the sense that it is “experience” that Oakeshott feels himself to have and 
to be in the midst of “Experience” ...remains...unowned...  [There is no] sense of the 
author's own personal and dynamic embodiment in [concrete experience].”169  Now, it 
may be the case that we feel this about Oakeshott because we are comparing his 
rendering of experience specifically with Polanyi's, which comes across as the opposite 
of all that Poteat is saying about Oakeshott's “experience”.  In defense of Oakeshott, 
however, and partly because I can also identify personally with his notion of experience, 
the fact that we might feel this about Oakeshott does not, for that matter, make Oakeshott 
someone whose rendering of experience is erroneous.  In other words, one's way of 
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experiencing the world does not make it the measure with which to judge another's way 
of experiencing the world.  I think that the way one experiences is a function of who one 
is.  Everyone is human, yet everyone is unique nonetheless.  This assessment may pose a 
problem to those weary of relativism.  They may think that if each one of us had a unique 
way of experiencing this world, this might entail that we each have our own world-
contents.  There is some truth to this on the surface.  For instance, we can all think of 
someone who seems to always see the positive aspect of everything and conversely, 
someone who sees but the negative.  Perception is relative, but only to a certain extent.  
Here I think we can draw from Polanyi in order to understand how, subjectively, we can 
limit ourselves to relative perceptions of our world, but, and this depends on the person 
one is, we can strive to transcend our subjectivity in order to get a glimpse of the reality 
of this world.  Oakeshott's conception of experience also helps us understand that 
experience is never merely personal, but is capable of being communicated, either 
verbally through rhetorical, poetic, or scientific discourse, or in an exemplary fashion as 
occurs in the teacher/pupil or master/apprentice relationship. 
 
 In light of this, depending on whom we are and therefore how we experience the 
world, we may sense that Oakeshott sees from without and Polanyi feels from within.  
This is why we do not get the same sense of experiential embodiment in Oakeshott's 
epistemology as we do in Polanyi's, even if this element is present in Oakeshott's 
epistemology nonetheless.  It is quite possible that they simply relate differently to the 
world about them, the character of Oakeshott's way of experiencing being highly 




kinesthetic.  This is not to say that Oakeshott's experience is somehow disembodied, or 
that Polanyi's experience does not involve thought.  Oakeshott's concept of practical 
knowledge does carry the meaning of embodiment.  Let us recall that he too referred to 
Chuang Zu's story of the 'disembodied knowledge of bygone men' in order to convey this; 
nor could Polanyi have put into words his epistemology without the structure of thought.  
Oakeshott and Polanyi simply experience the world in different ways, ways which 
emerge from the nature of their individuality.  This being said, I do acknowledge the 
“bird's eye view” aspect of Oakeshott's epistemology which Walter B. Mead is critical of 
because of its implicit denial of tacitness.170 
 
 In response to Mead, I would say that we are dealing here with two very different 
persons, one whose being seeks to capture the most comprehensive vision of experience 
and whose way of experiencing the world truly is from a bird's eye view, however 
reminded he is that an Absolutely encompassing perspective is impossible and perhaps 
not even relevant to human experience.  On the other hand, we have another individual 
whose way of experiencing the world brought him to the concept of tacitness.  We can 
only imagine, given the impossibility of being Polanyi himself, what the nature of his 
experience was like.  The words I have chosen to express my impression of it, i.e. he 
feels the world from within, are meant to contrast Polanyi's very embodied experience 
with Oakeshott's.  From the deep recesses of Polanyi's personhood, the concept of 
'tacitness' emerged.  Conversely, it is quite understandable why Oakeshott cannot settle 
with a concept of tacit knowledge.  It goes against the very nature of his person, which 
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seeks to comprehend the all.  This is why Oakeshott did not think that Polanyi's concept 
of personal knowledge consisted of a theory of knowledge.  For Oakeshott, a theory 
should bring to light the dimly seen.  If the latter is purposefully kept in the unspeakable 
dark, theory is not achieved.171  In defense of Polanyi however, he himself admitted to 
not having offered “any definite theory concerning the nature of things...”172 
 
 Our view should nevertheless be able to let these two individuals' perspectives 
exist in complementarity.  What enables us to appreciate this is the understanding that in 
Polanyi there is a bit of Oakeshott and in Oakeshott there is a bit of Polanyi.  They merge 
in their concepts of practical and subsidiary knowledge, and they part ways in their 
philosophical interpretations of life, namely, realism and idealism.173  This is why we 
cannot make too much of the “isms” they chose to identify with.  Polanyi's epistemology 
is fundamentally realist, and Oakeshott has indeed acknowledged himself to be an 
idealist, but these two schools of thought are interpretive frameworks of differing yet 
very real human experiences of the world.  Now, the fact that we can identify more with 
Oakeshott's or Polanyi's way of experiencing the world does not render the one whom we 
do not identify with less qualified.  Having said this, and therefore defending Oakeshott's 
notion of experience as equivalent to thought on the grounds that the character of 
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experience is unique to each and every one of us, I am nevertheless commending Polanyi 
for having so well described the experience of indwelling and subsidiarity, which seems 
to me to be common to all humans, even if highly developed in Polanyi's person.  
Polanyi's genius has been in the rendering of this character of knowledge.  It is in this 
sense that Polanyi's explanation of subsidiary knowledge more successfully achieves the 
necessary revision to our mistaken understanding of knowledge as methodologically 
assured. 
 
2-  Idealism without the 'ism' 
 The philosophical schools of thought we come to identify with have crystallized 
into the form implied in the notion of a 'school of thought'.  A closer look at them reveals 
the grey zones, or areas of overlapping thought, which dissolve the rigid classifications 
we label these different ways of conceiving our experience with.  Thus 'Idealism without 
the 'ism'' should be taken to signify the conciliatory manner in which I prefer Oakeshott's 
idealism to Polanyi's realism.  It is partly because idealism acknowledges the experience 
of the realist, that I consider the idealist's perspective to be more comprehensive.  
Personally, I could not be in harmony with a vision that negates the hidden essential 
realm of the given, for this denies the metaphysical and consequently the 
multidimensional nature of man.  Nor could I settle for a vision that negates man's 
essentially creative role as cognitive being.  Truth and reality are the fruit of the human 
spirit, but this does not render reality relative.  There is a contextual element in that truth 
is subject to the spirit of the times, but truth, or reality, is not a product of human 




cosmic counterpart, is what enables both the discovery and making of reality.  What 
would man's presence here on Earth be at all valuable for if no creativity was expected of 
him?  While Polanyi's realism is a much needed correction to relativism and nominalism, 
its implicit denial of this creative element signifies its limitation. 
 
 Oakeshott's idealism is closer to reality, even if missing a fundamental 
epistemological element which realism does provide.  Oakeshott's criterion of truth is that 
“Truth is the condition of the world of experience in which that world is satisfactory in 
itself.”174  In response, we feel that there is something missing.  There is the need for a 
measure with which to gauge satisfaction, and the “in itself” makes Oakeshott's criterion 
of coherence somewhat lacking.  It is the realist experience which provides this measure, 
which is that the satisfaction is derived when this “world of experience” conforms to the 
essential nature of that which is experienced.  In other words, there is a missing element 
in Oakeshott's idealism.  Experience or thought can be objective in so far as it conforms 
to the essential nature of the given or the real.  Then we can say that reality is that which 
is re-unified through the cognizing thought process.  Rudolf Steiner, who can be thought 
of as an objective idealist, has explained this well: 
Thinking first lifts out certain entities from the totality of the world-whole.  In the 
given nothing is really separate; everything is a connected continuum.  Then thinking 
relates these separate entities to each other in accordance with the thought-forms it 
produces, and also determines the outcome of this relationship.  When thinking 
restores a relationship between two separate sections of the world-content, it does not 
do so arbitrarily.  Thinking waits for what comes to light of its own accord as the 
result of restoring the relationship.  And it is this result alone which is knowledge of 
that particular section of the world content.175 
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In other words, the criterion of coherence is better explained by realism, even if realism 
fails to appreciate the truly creative dynamic of cognition.  If thought is to be coherent, it 
must conform to “what comes to light of its own accord.”  It must conform to the 
essential nature of that which is thought of.  This is why the quality of thought depends 
on its capacity to be real.  Therefore in response to Oakeshott's assessment that 
experience is thought is reality, I have to say yes, but only in so far as thought conforms 
to the real.  This is the missing ground in Oakeshott's epistemology. 
 
 Having said this however, I still have to choose Oakeshott's idealism over 
Polanyi's realism, albeit without the 'ism'.  Perhaps I would opt for an 'objective idealism', 
like that of Steiner's, if that were possible.  What I mean to say is that the creative 
element in idealism is what I cannot sacrifice.  On the one hand, I cannot identify with a 
strictly reflective notion of the mind.  On the other, I acknowledge the need to ground the 
ideal in the real.  For this reason, I think Oakeshott's idealism –without the ism –is more 
comprehensive.  The other reason is that I do not believe it necessary to posit the 
essential realm of being in another world than the one we belong to.  There is a need for 
thought to conform to something, and this something is the Platonic idea behind the form, 
but when we say 'behind' we do not need to posit this “place” in other worlds.  In what 
other world could we possibly ground the essential idea 'behind' the form?  More 
importantly, where does this yearning to do such a thing come from?  The realist would 
respond by saying that it is the experience of the divine which answers this question.  
This is why this particular debate can be so poignant, for what fires it is the experiential 




oneself to give in to the other, for the stakes are too high.  Cherished on the one hand is 
the belief in God and the value of humility, while on the other, what cannot be sacrificed 
is man's responsibility for his own moral conduct.  In response to this epistemological 
debate, I have to say that the essential idea is indeed hidden, but it is of that which is 
form, just as the form is of that which is idea.  Our physical bodies do not belong to one 
world, while our essential or ethereal soul and spirit bodies belong to another.  The whole 
is not divisible as such.  And so the essential ground of personhood is not external to the 
person.  Idealism seeks not to posit the essential realm of being in an external world, for 
its perspective has gone beyond the existential need to do so.  This is why idealism is 
more comprehensive, for it comprehends the experience of the realist, yet it rectifies the 
illusion of the need to ground being elsewhere than in the world-content. 
 
3- The Point of No Return 
 It was suggested by Polanyi that what was needed now, in order to rectify our 
mistaken assumptions about the nature of knowledge and readjust the modern 
disequilibrium which has denied our cognitive powers, is to recognize belief as 
epistemologically prior to knowledge: “we must now go back to St. Augustine... [who] 
taught that all knowledge was a gift of grace, for which we must strive under the 
guidance of antecedent belief: nisi credideritis, non intelligitis”?176  This is a problematic 
solution for it disregards the experiential impossibility to go back to another concrete 
experiential point in time.  It is programmatic, and for this very reason, because it does 
not consider the concrete reality at hand, is not tenable.  The concrete reality is that for 
many, the experience of faith is either a) not available; b) negated; or c) integrated and 
                                                




surpassed.  We are dealing with societies where vast amounts of individuals are no longer 
brought up in a classical Christian pedagogical framework, where some are even brought 
up to denigrate the Christian experience, and where some have gone beyond faith to other 
experiential realities.  How can we possibly “go back to St. Augustine” given that this is 
the concrete situation we are in? 
 
 In agreement with Eric Voegelin who also dealt with the modern epistemological 
predicament in his New Science of Politics, “the very historicity of human existence, that 
is, the unfolding of the typical in meaningful concreteness, precludes a valid 
reformulation of principles through return to a former concreteness.”177  The context in 
which Voegelin was writing there was the need to restore political science to the 
consciousness of principles, but his advice is as applicable to our epistemological 
discussion here.  In other words, we cannot go back to St. Augustine because “the very 
historicity of human existence” precludes this possibility.  And so we can take Voegelin's 
counsel that “the principles must be regained by a work of theoretization which starts 
from the concrete, historical situation of the age...”178  We must first start by asking 
ourselves what is our concrete, historical situation.  Now, because Polanyi's experience 
was inherently Christian, it is understandable that he would conceive of the solution to go 
back to St. Augustine, because for him this was an experiential possibility.  But what of 
all the others who do not have this experience for whatever reason?  One cannot indicate 
an experiential destination that lies in the past. 
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 As such, Polanyi's solution may betray his own concept of personal knowledge.  
We cannot simply go back to a given experiential point in time.  To enunciate such an 
imperative is to disregard the underlying experiential requirements to go from any point 
A to B.  Polanyi's fiduciary program is untenable because a program inherently leaves the 
experiential backdrop out of the equation.  It is a formalized equation.  It seems as though 
Polanyi is liable here to the very rationalism he is trying to rectify.  The fiduciary 
program is a superimposed plan.  If any fiduciary element is to be revitalized, it would 
have to emerge out of experiential discovery in the natural flow of things.  This is rather 
doubtful in this given historical reality that is modernity.  As previously mentioned, a lot 
of people either deny the experience of Grace or acknowledge themselves to have 
integrated this experience and moved on.  Furthermore, a lot of people have felt betrayed 
by the institutional pillars that have been the carriers of the message of Grace. 
 
 It is for all of these reasons, and because we must acknowledge the historical 
reality we inhabit, that I think we should not adopt a reactionary oppositional stance 
towards modernity.  We do need to look at it with critical eyes, but no matter how 
dissatisfied we may be with its excess egocentrism and rationalism, we somehow need to 
find a way to integrate the modern experience, by seeking to comprehend the creative 
element in this modern experiential reality that is unfolding before us.  We need to create 
harmony, not by going back to a previous experience, for this is impossible, but by 
integrating what we have come to experience so far, and adjusting or recalibrating our 
conceptualizations through newly discovered experiential horizons.  It is in this sense that 




disequilibrium than Polanyi's fiduciary program.  In idealism, it is understood that there is 
a “logically necessary progress of the spirit.”179  This progressive dynamic precludes a 
static understanding of personhood as well as the possibility to return to a previous 
experiential point in time. 
 
 Interestingly, Polanyi had also pointed to the impossibility of returning to a 
previous cognitive state of mind once a cognitive leap had been made across a logical gap 
that separates not-knowing from knowing.  It leaves me perplexed as to why he would 
then propose the solution to go back to St. Augustine.  Perhaps it did not occur to him 
that the experience of faith, to have faith, was obsolete for so many, that simply 
designating an experiential destination would not achieve the intended results for the very 
same reason why methodological exactitude does not ensure the sought for answers to 
our questions.  It is easy to project one's experiential reality on others without realizing 
that two people can be worlds apart experientially.  We all do it.  This is why it is 
understandable that Polanyi would point the way back to St. Augustine, which for him 
did not consist of an experiential impossibility, it was his experience.  This being said, 
and having expressed the problem with this solution, I am suggesting that Oakeshott's 
experiential framework provides a more fruitful approach to the modern disequilibrium. 
 
 In idealism, philosophy is the “perpetual re-establishment of coherence.”180  This 
understanding, coupled with the progressive dynamic of the spirit, means that man tries 
to find coherence between perpetually new experiential discoveries and the systems of 
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thought that explain his experience.  Let us recall Voegelin's explanation of the mystical 
philosopher's experience as an example.  The Socratic discovery of the new truth about 
the order of the soul was “a discovery which produces its experiential material along with 
its explication; the openness of the soul is experienced through the opening of the soul 
itself.”181  This means that man was not always the way he is now, nor will he be what he 
is now.  Just as the Socratic mystical experience engendered the experiential 
differentiation which enabled the mystics to ground their reason for opposing the pagan 
experience, so will the modern experience eventually engender the experiential 
differentiation that will enable us to ground our reason for declining any solution to go 
back in time to another experiential reality.  The implied dynamism of spirit evolution in 
idealism precludes the possibility to go back to an older truth about the order of the soul.  
Thus when Polanyi wishes to go back to an understanding of knowledge as a gift of 
Grace that we must strive for under the guidance of antecedent belief, the question arises 
as to how that can be done when it seems to be that the modern experience has made the 
experience of Grace obsolete for so many.  It is for these reasons that Polanyi's fiduciary 
program is not tenable, and that Oakeshott's experiential framework, however omniscient 
it may seem to some, is more coherent with our present experiential reality. 
 
4- Cognitive Powers of the Mind 
 Let us give our attention once more to the current state of political science.  
Perhaps the methodological wars have subsided, and it is sometimes said that we have 
moved beyond positivism in the social sciences, but one can notice that positivism left a 
mark too deep for this to be the case.  The reality is that we are dealing here with an 
                                                




expression of modernity the experiential roots of which cannot be “swept” away simply 
by means of logical clarification.  There is no quick fix solution to the root cause which 
points to a disequilibrium in the modern psyche.  Furthermore, when someone holds a 
dogmatic position, there is great difficulty in communicating logically the reason why 
this position is not tenable.  As Voegelin had pointed out, “disregard for elementary 
verities happens to be one of the characteristics of the positivistic attitude.”182  We can 
recall Polanyi's example of the European anthropologist, who was studying the Azande 
tribe, his incapacity to convey to them the illogical grounds on which they attributed 
power to the snake poison used by the shaman.  In parallel, the average political science 
department still resonates the positivist attitude in the textbooks and methodological 
instructions given to students.  What is by far the most debilitating effect of this attitude 
is its denial of the intuitive capacities of the mind, the expression of which becomes 
methodological neurosis.  For example, when a student hands in his term paper, and the 
importance of the insights are overshadowed by the emphasis on the prescribed 
methodology, not only does this protocol deny the cognitive powers of the mind, it is the 
most destructive aspect of positivism in that it brutalizes the creative mind to the point of 
creating human automatons. 
 
 Both Oakeshott and Polanyi have provided us with the explanation as to why a 
positivist understanding of knowledge is absurd.  We saw with Oakeshott that positivism 
acknowledges only technical knowledge as the right kind of knowledge, while in reality, 
all knowledge is practical first, and then may be technical, but always on practical 
premises.  Polanyi has explained how the kind of value-free, objectivist knowledge that 
                                                




positivism celebrates is a perverted understanding because it denies the personal 
coefficient in every act of knowledge.  The intuitive intimations present throughout are 
implied in both of their concepts of practical and tacit knowledge.  However, there is in 
Polanyi's epistemology an element which strikes a higher note.  I have found that 
Polanyi's elucidation of the cognitive powers of the mind achieves more in light of a 
needed restoration, not only in political science, but for the modern, materialistic mind in 
general. 
 
 In Oakeshott's epistemology, knowledge is arrived at by means of experience, the 
practical nature of which signifies a contingent, traditional, and learned experience, but 
we never get a sense in which our cognitive faculties have the power of any kind of 
transcendence whatsoever.  This is the case if we consider his idealism to be sceptical.  If, 
on the other hand, we take Walter B. Mead's understanding of Oakeshott's idealism at 
face value, it may be that, in Oakeshott's epistemology, it is the philosophical experience 
which provides the vehicle for transcendence, whereby the limits of arrested experience 
are transcended by the all-comprehensive philosophical vantage point.  I would suggest 
that Oakeshott's psyche was perhaps too “British” or pragmatic to have espoused such an 
omniscient idealism.  Yet we do get a sense in which his depiction of philosophy could 
lend itself to transcendence: “experience without reservation or arrest, experience which 
is critical throughout, unhindered and undistracted by what is subsidiary, partial or 
abstract...” however “fleeting and elusive.”183  Could it be that what Oakeshott 
experiences in those fleeting, nocturnal moments of clarity is transcendental?  It could 
possibly be the case, but the experience of transcendence is understood as illusory for 
                                                




Oakeshott.  There is no concept which apprehends the personal and universal poles of 
commitment because there is no need to posit the essential realm of being externally.  
This is due to the admittedly idealist premise from which Oakeshott is explaining the 
nature of experience as a unified whole. 
 
I agree with Oakeshott's view that there is indeed no need to posit the ground of 
essential being externally; yet we must safeguard the notion of transcendence that is 
implied in Polanyi's concept of the personal/universal pole of commitment because this 
concept comprehends more fully the multidimensional nature of man as body, soul, ego, 
and spirit.  The episteme is lost otherwise.  Let us recall that for Polanyi, the concept of 
the personal/universal pole of commitment served to express the experience of 
transcending the subjective limitations of ego consciousness and making contact with the 
real.  As such, the real for Polanyi is something other than the 'I am'.  His 
phenomenological epistemology implied that man can make contact with what is 'other' 
because there is a “yearning” from both ends of the pole of commitment to meet and a 
capacity for 'fusion'.  Polanyi's intention was to overcome the polarized misconception of 
the subject/object divide by means of indwelling and breaking out.  The transcendental 
nature of the 'breaking out' or 'logical leap' necessary to come to know the real was 
implied in his concept of the pole.  This experience cannot be tossed aside flippantly.  
Somehow we must reconcile the very real experience of transcendence with idealism.  
This would mean that transcendence does not involve a movement from our world to 
another external world beyond ours, and that the real or the essential nature of that which 




agreement with Steiner, “There is... not the slightest reason for seeking the foundation of 
things outside the given physical and spiritual world, as long as a comprehensive 
investigation of this world does not lead to the discovery of elements within it that clearly 
point to an influence coming from beyond it.”184  This would imply that the personal and 
universal poles of commitment would constitute two dimensional areas of the same 
world, in this case, of one's being.  Transcendence could then be understood as a 
movement characterized by the overcoming of one's ego in the experiential discovery of 
one's spirit or higher mind, and not a kind of gnostic 'stepping out' of one's own 
consciousness.  It would mean that, the experience we have come to characterize as 
transcendence was in fact not outside of experience but very much part of the human 
experiential horizon.  If we characterize the experience of transcendence as wholly 
illusory, without clarifying that the illusion consists not in the notion of transcendence 
itself but in grounding that which is of this physical and spiritual world in another world, 
then we lose the episteme, for it is the communication with one's spirit that provides the 
measure with which one can transcend subjective opining or doxa, and know for oneself. 
 
 In Polanyi's epistemology, there is truly a sense in which our cognitive faculties 
are capable of transcendence.  It may be that it is because Polanyi's epistemology is 
inherently phenomenological that he achieves this.  A phenomenological epistemology 
suggests that, by means of indwelling, we let come to us what is essential to that which 
we study.  In other words, as Steiner puts it, “thinking waits for what comes to light of its 
own accord...”  We can appreciate this element in Polanyi's epistemology when he is 
describing how the real “seeks” to make contact with us, and when he expresses 
                                                




knowledge as a gift.  Somehow Polanyi's epistemology breaks out into a whole other 
register of experience, the resonance of which transcends intellectual boundaries.  We get 
a sense of this with Polanyi's explanation of the cognitive leap across the logical gap, 
which he thought possible on the grounds of faith.  In other words, what enabled the leap 
was the belief in finding something meaningful on the other side.  He also expressed 
transcendence with his concept of the pole of commitment, with the two grounds, one 
personal and the other universal.  Finally, he expressed it with his concept of indwelling 
and breaking out.  In each of these conceptualizations, there is an element of 
transcendence which enables contact with reality.  We perceive reality by overcoming or 
transcending our subjective limitations that had previously kept us from seeing this 
reality.  We may also describe this movement as integrating or moving beyond ego 
consciousness.  Whichever way we describe it is not important.  The key is that our 
concept must be able to communicate the essence of this experience.  Transcendence is 
part of the human experience.  By demystifying the nature of our cognitive powers 
through these concepts, Polanyi has shown us the grounds on which we can re-
acknowledge and trust our intuitive faculties.  Herein lies Polanyi's greatest achievement, 
and it is in this sense that I feel Polanyi's epistemology to be more fruitful at this point in 




Conclusion:  A New Science of Politics? 
 
 Keeping these four assessments in mind, we may contemplate what an 
Oakeshottian/Polanyian political science would consist of.  Whether our departments 
would be called 'political science' or 'political studies' might depend on whether this 
development leaned more heavily towards Polanyi, the former, or Oakeshott, the latter.  
A more Polanyian leaning in our hypothetical development of political science would 
have our departments called political science, but science here would refer to its original 
meaning, well described by Voegelin simply as “a truthful account of the structure of 
reality, as the theoretical orientation of man in his world, and as the great instrument for 
man's understanding of his own position in the universe...”185  Our approach to politics 
would be to seek the essential, and for this purpose, we would not let method dictate the 
course, but the course, the method.  Oakeshott's understanding of science might have 
reflected what had come to pass for science at the time, i.e. a positivist understanding of 
it.186  If so, it would be the reason why he could not agree with a “scientific” approach to 
politics.  Yet, as previously mentioned, he was very much in agreement with Polanyi 
about the real nature of knowledge, i.e. not based on technical rules but as having 
emerged out of practice and tradition.  This does not equate Oakeshott's understanding of 
science with Polanyi's, but it certainly raises doubt as to the claim that Oakeshott was a 
positivist when it came to his understanding of science.  He was not a positivist, and he 
was able to see its expression in its many forms, including science. 
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 The Oakeshottian element in such a development in the academic study of politics 
would imply a greater emphasis on historical and philosophical approaches to the study.  
The historical classes would be of prime importance, for it is through these that the youth 
may gain a civilizational perspective in which they may get a sense of where it is that 
they come from.  A greater understanding of the traditions that have fuelled theirs and 
other civilizations would of course be nurtured in such classes.  Political philosophy 
classes would no doubt focus more on introducing this youth to the experience of 
philosophy than the actual subject of politics, for we cannot forget that for Oakeshott, the 
university experience consisted not in training the youth for the workforce, but in offering 
a place in which one could escape practical concerns for the sole purpose of becoming 
acquainted with the great conversation of mankind amongst the several modes of 
experience that had come to maturity, and in this process get a greater sense of one's 
identity in this world. 
 
 Polanyi's influence would engender a turn towards a phenomenological approach 
to the study of politics.  This implies that, instead of imposing model methods upon the 
particulars of the political world, we would let come to light of its own accord what is 
essential to the political problems we seek to elucidate.  A classical understanding of 
education, as in the turning around of periagoge, would be necessary.  Of course this 
would imply that those in the position to effect such a development in political science 
would have had the experience themselves.  If that were the case, classes would no longer 




structure of political reality.  We would finally have moved beyond a relativist 
educational approach.  Uncertain though he may have been of the ultimate ground of his 
own intuition, his Personal Knowledge has struck a chord, the resonance of which has re-
awakened Meno's paradox from the slumber of the modern mind.  With Polanyi's concept 
of personal and subsidiary knowledge, we can understand why we know what to look for 
even if we do not grasp the whole of that which we are seeking to know.  We recollect 
from the deepest recesses of our personhood that which we already know, yet cannot put 
into words in order to come to reveal that whole. 
 
 If the nature of knowledge were understood to be both practical and personal, any 
attempt, however subtle, to rid the human coefficient of the contingent nature of 
knowledge, would simply seem absurd.  Thus there would be no need to separate fact 
from value because it would be understood that our values are upheld not arbitrarily but 
on experiential premises of tradition and theoretical observations.  In other words, we 
would recognize the inherent human capacity for theoretical orientation which enables a 
critical assessment of values.  Political values such as order, authority, and representation 
would no longer require the veil of doxa but would be affirmed with the authority derived 
from man's theoretical orientation towards the world.  We would no longer need to hide 
behind the cloak of political philosophy in order to explore metaphysical dimensions 
because these would be understood as inherently part of any political discussion.  Both 
philosophers' epistemologies would free us from being so absorbed with methodological 
concerns.  Methods would not rule the study of politics but would be subservient to it.  




science would restore the mind as proper bearer of authority in matters of methodological 
judgment.  Consequently, we might notice a rush of creative insight, no longer burdened 
by positivist dogma and methodological neuroses.  Political science might indeed be 
restored to the great science of man's existence in society and history, “the order in which 
human nature reaches its maximal actualization.”187 
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